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HOW HISTORY HAS SHAPED  
THE HONG KONG REVENUE REGIME 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
__________________________________________________ 
 
 
Hong Kong has had a remarkable history.  Prior to the British acquiring 
sovereignty over Hong Kong Island in the early 1840s (essentially at the point of 
a gun) it was a sparsely populated, far flung outpost of the Chinese Empire 
devoted mainly to fishing and traditional farming.  Under British rule, it grew, over 
time, to become one of the most successful City-States in the modern world.  In 
1997, this high-rise remnant of the British Imperial adventure once more reverted 
to the sovereignty of China: now the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  The 
PRC is not only the world’s largest One Party State – it is also its most 
successful.   
 
The development of Hong Kong’s British influenced Revenue Regime is also 
remarkable.  The early configuration of that system was a direct product of what 
is sometimes referred to as the first era of globalization, which was a profoundly 
energized by European colonization and empire building.  The aggressive, 
ultimately violent, Japanese response to that European example drove further 
changes in the Hong Kong Tax System.  Yet, the system which emerged in Hong 
Kong after World War II looked a lot like a recreation from a 19th century Tax 
Museum.  This, more by accident than design, proved especially well suited to 
fostering Hong Kong’s dramatically successful integration into the post-war, world 
trading system as the modern era of globalization began.  Today, Hong Kong’s 
Tax System is adapting further to newer regional and global trading relationships. 
 
This paper provides an overview of the historical development of Hong Kong’s 
Revenue Regime and the way it which has been shaped continuously, by its own 
most particular history. 
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HOW HISTORY HAS SHAPED  
THE HONG KONG REVENUE REGIME 
 
BY  
 
RICHARD CULLEN AND ANTONIETTA WONG1 
 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This paper is, essentially, a case study of the long-term impact of globalization on 
the development of the Revenue Regime in Hong Kong.2  Revenue Regime is 
the broad term which we use to denote the full array government money raising 
mechanisms (apart from fines and debt) deployed, historically and today, in Hong 
Kong.  As we explain below, Hong Kong has, from the start of the period of its 
modern history, relied, importantly, on mechanisms other than conventional 
                                                 
1  Richard Cullen: LLB(Hons) University of Melbourne, Australia, PhD Osgoode Hall Law School, 
Canada, Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law (FLW), The University of Hong Kong (HKU).  Co-
Director, Taxation Law Research Programme, FLW, HKU, Research Associate, Civic Exchange, 
Hong Kong and Research Fellow, Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute, Monash 
University, Australia.  Antonietta Wong: PhD Monash University, Australia, Research Fellow, 
Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute, Monash University, Australia.  This paper is a re-
published version of a paper previously published electronically by Civic Exchange in Hong Kong 
(see: http://www.civic-exchange.org/eng/upload/files/200812_hkTaxRegime.pdf.)  Internet-based 
citations were all current at the time of writing.  Richard Cullen has retained hard copies of cited 
items.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at a Symposium held on February 29, 2008 
at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario in Canada, in honour of the late Professor Alex Easson.  
We are grateful to the organizers of the Symposium for their agreement to re-publish this work. 
 
2  The leading Canadian tax scholar, Alex Easson, wrote extensively, prior to his death in January, 
2007, about the impact of international factors on the shaping of municipal Tax Systems – and the 
way that different Tax Systems interact with one another.  He also considered, in considerable 
depth, the importance of the concept of source and the role it played in the day to day operation of 
many Tax Systems.  See, for example: Easson, Alex, Common Law Approaches to the 
Determination of the Source of Income (2006) 60 Bulletin for International Taxation, 495; Easson, 
Alex, Harmful Tax Competition: An Evaluation of the OECD Initiative (2004) 34 Tax Notes 
International, 1037; and Easson Alex, Do We Still Need TaxTtreaties? (2000) 54 Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation, 619.  His writing has stimulated both of us to re-think how the 
Revenue Regime has developed in Hong Kong since 1841 and what have been the key 
international political, economic, social - and tax – influences on that process.   
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taxation to raise public revenues.  The two most notable non-tax sources of 
public revenue, historically, have been government dealings related to opium and 
land.  Opium trade revenues ceased to be a key source of government income in 
Hong Kong by the 1920s.  Direct and indirect land-transaction revenues remain a 
notable feature of the current Hong Kong Revenue Regime.  We use the term 
Tax System, below, to refer to that part of the broad public revenue system which 
relies on recognizable forms of direct and indirect taxation.3 
 
When we think, today, about globalization, we tend to consider it as a post World 
War Two (WW II) phenomenon which has gathered truly significant pace as the 
communications-technology revolution has unfolded over the last two decades.4  
This modern version of globalization has deep foundations, however, within the 
type of integrated global economy which was developed for well over 100 years 
prior to World War One (WWI) - during the colonial era.  Primarily, the colonial 
era involved European based colonizers and non-European colonized 
jurisdictions.  In terms of scope and political and economic durability, the British 
Empire was the pre-eminent product of this period of world development 
(notwithstanding the loss of the American Colonies in the American 
                                                 
3  The principal (since WW II) tax imposing law in Hong Kong is the Inland Revenue Ordinance 
(1947).  The term Ordinance signifies (amongst other things) in Anglo Common Law, a form of 
delegated legislation, such as the laws passed by an inferior, colonial legislature, see: Walker, 
David M., The Oxford Companion to Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980) 906.  All HKSAR 
laws continue to be called Ordinances – apart from the Basic Law (see below).   
 
4  “The term “globalization” describes the increased mobility of goods, services, labour, technology 
and capital throughout the world. Although globalization is not a new development, its pace has 
increased with the advent of new technologies, especially in the area of telecommunications.”  
See, Globalization Definition at: 
http://www.canadianeconomy.gc.ca/english/economy/globalization.html 
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Revolutionary War).5  Today, very little of the offshore (former) British Empire 
remains within the control of the UK.  The small (6.5 square kilometres) 
Overseas Territory of Gibraltar is one of the few remaining exceptions.6   
 
Prior to July 1997, the Overseas Territory of Hong Kong was also such an 
exception.  On July 1 of that year, sovereignty over Hong Kong reverted to the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the former British Territory became the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the PRC.7  The HKSAR 
acquired, at this time, a new Constitution, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Basic Law)8. 
                                                 
5  See: British Empire, Encyclopedia Britannica, at: http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-
9016519/British-Empire; and British Empire, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Empire. 
 
6  See, Gibraltar,at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gi.html. 
 
7  Hong Kong consists of Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula situated on the Mainland 
opposite Hong Kong Island, the New Territories comprising the area north of Kowloon up to the 
Shenzhen River and 235 islands.  Hong Kong Island was ceded in perpetuity to Britain by China 
in 1842 at the end of the First Opium War (1839-1842) pursuant to the Treaty of Nanking 
(Nanjing).  The Kowloon Peninsula was ceded in perpetuity in 1860 at the end of the Second 
Opium War (1856-1860) under the Convention of Peking (Beijing).  The New Territories and the 
islands were leased for 99 years from July 1, 1898 under the Convention Respecting the Extension 
of Hong Kong Territory.  The HKSAR was established in accordance with the Joint Declaration 
of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (Joint Declaration) 
signed on December 19, 1984.  The PRC declared in the Joint Declaration that it had decided to 
resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong (the leased territories, together with Hong 
Kong Island and Kowloon) with effect from July 1, 1997.  The UK declared that it would restore 
Hong Kong to the PRC with effect from July 1, 1997.  The Joint Declaration entered came into 
force on May 27. 1985 when the two governments exchanged instruments of ratification.  It was 
registered as a treaty at the United Nations by the Chinese and British governments on June 12, 
1985, which creates international rights and obligations for both parties to it. 
 
8  The Basic Law was adopted by the National People’s Congress of the PRC on April 4, 1990 and 
came into force on July 1, 1997. The Court of Final Appeal, the pinnacle of the judicial process 
(which is entirely separate, under the Basic Law) found, in 1999, that the Basic Law enjoyed 
constitutional status within the HKSAR (Ng Kar Ling & Others v. Director of Immigration [1991] 
1 Hong Kong Law Reports & Digest, 315).  Much more recently, the President of the PRC, Hu 
Jintao, endorsed the “supreme status of the Basic Law” in Hong Kong and also noted that, apart 
from the HKSAR, all levels of government and all people on the Mainland [PRC] must observe 
the Basic Law (see: Hu, Jintao, Passing the test, South China Morning Post, July 2, 2007, A14 
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In the period since the end of WW II, in 1945, two City-States9 have thrived in 
East Asia; Singapore and Hong Kong.  Both owe their modern beginnings to their 
choosing, by the British, as key ports servicing the trading and military needs of 
the 19th century, British Empire.  The British were attracted by the safe 
anchorages offered by the deep waters surrounding both Singapore and Hong 
Kong.  Moreover, they possessed the military might to assert their interest. 
 
Prior to the arrival of the British in 1841, Hong Kong was home to a series of 
scattered Chinese fishing and farming communities.  For over 150 years, the 
British maintained Hong Kong as an enclave, plainly separated from Mainland 
China in many ways.  We have recently passed the 10th anniversary of Beijing’s 
resumption of dominion over what is now the HKSAR.  Notwithstanding Hong 
Kong’s return to the “Motherland”, the bustling city at the mouth of the Pearl River 
remains a very separate enclave within China.  Hong Kong, today, operates as a 
City-State within the most populous nation on Earth and within the largest One 
Party State (OPS) – run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) - the world has 
                                                                                                                                                 
(English text of speech made by President Hu Jintao at the inauguration of the new HKSAR 
Government on July 1, 2007)).  These comments by the President could be argued to recognize the 
elevation of the Basic Law to a status above Mainland PRC laws in certain matters directly related 
to Hong Kong. 
 
9  City-States are typically defined as “an independent political unit consisting of a city and 
surrounding countryside.  They reached their peak in ancient Greece, although a number, like 
Florence, Venice and Genoa endured in Italy until the middle of the 19th century.  Bremen and 
Hamburg also retained this status until they were absorbed into the modern German State.  See, 
http://www.answers.com/topic/city-state. (See, too: Glotz, G, The Greek City and Its Institutions 
(Knopf, New York, 1951 (reprinted 1969)); and Ehrenberg, V., The Greek State (2nd Ed.) 
(Methuen, London, 1969 (reprinted 1972)). 
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ever seen.10  As we shall see, the HKSAR is today even more fiscally separated 
from the PRC Mainland11 than Hong Kong was from the UK.  
 
Hong Kong has had to grapple with all manner of challenges over the last 100 
plus years, relying, for the greater part, primarily on its own local resources.  By 
one count, these are minimal.  The most striking natural resource is the large, 
deepwater harbour (which so attracted the British in the 1840s).  Next, there is 
the geographical location.  Nowadays, around 50% of the world’s population 
resides within 4 hours flying time.  Few other places hold a better claim to being 
at a “cross-roads” location.  Hong Kong’s most significant asset, though, has 
been its largely Chinese, local population. 
 
Our aim in this paper is to explain how the Revenue Regime in Hong Kong has 
developed over the course of its remarkable modern history.  Throughout the 
period of this history, this regime has been notably shaped by the power of 
globalization.  This continues to be the case today.   
                                                 
10  The Chinese OPS is still primarily organized, politically, according to principles laid down by 
Lenin.  Thus, only the CCP is permitted to exercise any meaningful political power.  
Economically, the PRC has abandoned, to a very large extent, Marxist principles of economic 
organization and regulation.  For a review of this phenomenon, see, Roberts, J.A.G., A History of 
China (2nd ed.) (Palgrave-MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2006) Chapter 7. 
 
11  We use the terms, “PRC Mainland” and “Mainland” to indicate the PRC, excluding the HKSAR 
the MacauSAR and Taiwan.  These four entities are sometimes collectively referred to as “Greater 
China”.  The HKSAR and the MacuaSAR are both recognized as also being component 
jurisdictions within the PRC enjoying a special level of autonomy within the PRC Unitary State.  
Taiwan, has remained entirely separated from the PRC in an operational sense since the end of the 
Chinese Civil war in 1949.  Few nations recognize Taiwan as a separate country at International 
Law, however.  Beijing regards Taiwan as a “renegade Province” of the PRC.  See, for a short 
historical overview of the history of the Chinese Unitary State and the relationship of the 
components of Greater China to that Unitary State: Cullen, Richard, Political Reform in Hong 
Kong –Within Greater China (2007) Politika Annual Journal, 59. 
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One can identify three broad periods of globalized influence on the development 
of the Hong Kong Tax System.  These can be expressed as: (A) the Imperial 
Globalization era; (B) the Cold War Globalization era; and (C) the Modern 
Globalization era.  Category A covers the primary colonial era.  Category B 
covers the first forty-plus years of the post WW II era when world trade began to 
be notably re-integrated.  This “normal” world trade system encompassed the 
Western developed nations and much of the developing world. However, 
alongside this system there existed the very significant, often culpably inefficient 
trade-world of the Communist-bloc countries (also known as the “Eastern Bloc”).  
This latter system was grumpily and awkwardly connected to the “normal” system 
when it suited or was necessary.  But throughout this era, until 1989, the West 
(headquartered in Washington) and the East (headquartered in Moscow) 
maintained an intense militarized standoff which spawned recurrent proxy-war 
offshoots.12  In November 1989, the Berlin Wall was opened (and later came 
down) signaling the end of the Cold War era.13  At about the same time, a new 
technology revolution began to gather serious pace.  In particular, it transformed 
the cost, capacity and availability of computing capacity and, via the Internet, 
world-wide communications.14  This combination of the collapse of the Eastern 
                                                 
12  See, Cold War, Oxford Paperback Encyclopedia (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000). 
 
13  See, Berlin, Oxford Paperback Encyclopedia (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000).  In fact, 
President George Bush of the USA and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the former USSR, 
declared that the Cold War was officially over at a summit in Malta in December 1989, Cold War, 
ibid.   
 
14  See, Communications, Oxford Paperback Encyclopedia (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000). 
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Bloc economic system and the communications revolution were particularly 
energizing, as it turned out, for world trade and thus the Modern Globalization era 
commenced.15 
 
Directly below, we explain the evolution of the governance structure of the 
HKSAR within the context of Hong Kong’s political development as a component 
in the British Empire.  In Part 3, we review the historical (colonial) development of 
Hong Kong’s Revenue Regime prior to providing an overview of that regime as it 
applies, today, in the HKSAR.  Parts 2 and 3 lay the foundations for the 
discussion, in some depth, in Part 4 of the long-term intersection between 
globalization and the shaping of the Tax System in Hong Kong.  Part 5 is the 
Conclusion. 
 
 
2.0 POLITICAL STRUCTURE EVOLUTION  
 
2.1 COLONIAL POWER WITHIN THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
Following the loss, by Britain, of the American Colonies by 1782,16 the political 
system in the United Kingdom (UK) progressively underwent a series of 
fundamental changes.  The then still politically active Monarchy was deeply 
discredited by defeat in America (in what became the United States of America 
(USA)).  Parliament had notably asserted itself, at the expense of the Monarchy, 
following the “Glorious Revolution” in 1688.  But in the 18th century, the Monarch 
                                                 
15  See footnote 4. 
 
16  Timeline of the American Revolutionary War, at: http://www.ushistory.org/march/timeline.htm. 
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was still a key political actor, especially in foreign affairs.  Parliament remained a 
comparatively weak institution in many respects.  The Judiciary was, by then, 
well established as an institution enjoying significant independence.17 
 
Over the decades following defeat in America (and especially after the death of 
George III in 1820) power moved markedly from the Monarchy to Parliament.  
More significantly, it moved to the Executive Government within Parliament.  
Westminster or Parliamentary Government thus emerged as the product of a 
remarkable, “measured revolution”, as the new political model for the UK.  The 
essence of this system mandates (as a matter of convention in the UK) that 
every member of the Government must be a serving member of the Parliament 
(House of Commons or House of Lords).  Governments become so by 
establishing themselves as enjoying continuing majority support in the House of 
Commons (or the Lower House of Parliament in a Westminster-style, bicameral 
system).18   
 
Despite these radical developments within the UK itself, this new political model 
was not immediately exported throughout the British Empire.  The British retained 
what might be termed the “George III model” (a very powerful Executive, a 
                                                 
17  See: Parliament of Great Britain, in Walker, op. cit. note 3. 
 
18  See: Parliament of England, Parliament of Great Britain and Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
ibid.  Another term arising from this political-software-revolution was “Constitutional Monarchy”.  
This emerged as the term which best described the new, greatly reduced figurehead status for the 
Monarch.  See: Parliament of the United Kingdom, ibid; and Monarchy, in Crystal, David, (ed.) 
The Cambridge Paperback Encyclopedia (3rd. ed.) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1993). 
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comparatively weak Legislature and a separate Judiciary) as its colonial 
governance template administered through what came to be known as the 
Colonial Office.  The position of Secretary of State for the Colonies was first 
established in 1768 in response to restiveness in the American Colonies.  By 
1801, after the loss of those colonies a new position of Secretary of State for War 
and the Colonies was established.  In 1854 a fully separate Colonial Office was 
established under the now Secretary of State for the Colonies.19 
 
By the late 18th century, a regular pattern for the administration of British 
territories overseas was established; a Governor appointed by the Crown was 
assisted by a nominated Executive and Legislative Council.  Typically, a separate 
Judiciary was also established.  This governance structure was commonly set 
down in a principal (Executive issued rather than legislatively enacted) separate 
document for each colony called the Letters Patent (equivalent to a Constitution).  
Each British colonial jurisdiction had a subordinate Legislature, as opposed to a 
sovereign Legislature.  The authorities in such colonies normally were not 
competent to pass laws which had extra-territorial effect.  (This meant, inter alia, 
that such colonies could not institute a system of taxation based on residence 
because the relevant Government would not possess the power to tax effectively 
beyond the geographic borders of its territory.)  Describing the particular (and 
typical) case of Hong Kong, Edwards put it this way: 
                                                 
19  See, Secretary of State for the Colonies, at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_of_State_for_the_Colonies. 
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Authority emanates from the Queen in Council in Great Britain and, under 
certain Orders in Council, consolidated under what are called the Hong 
Kong Letters Patent 1917-1988, authority is delegated to a Governor 
appointed by the Crown and the Legislative and Executive Councils in 
Hong Kong   Clause VII of the Letters Patent provides that “the 
Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council, 
may make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Colony”.  
Such words, or words similar in effect, have been used in almost all of the 
Letters Patent constituting the governments of British colonies and there is 
a substantial body of case law relating to them.  The Governor in Council 
is a subordinate legislative body and, for any law to be validly made under 
the Letters Patent, there must be a sufficient nexus with the Colony.  The 
Hong Kong government cannot enact legislation which does not have a 
real connection with the Colony.  The jurisdiction of the Governor in 
Council extends to the colonial territories but not beyond.  Further, para 8 
of cl XXVI of the Hong Kong Royal Instructions 1917-1988, which 
supplement the Letters Patent, provides that “the Governor shall not   
assent   to any Bill   of an extraordinary nature and importance 
whereby [the Crown’s] prerogative or the rights and property of [the 
Queen’s] subjects not residing in the Colony, or the trade and shipping of 
[the] United Kingdom and its dependencies, may be prejudiced”.  These 
provisions have great significance in the context of the government’s 
power to levy taxation.20 
 
2.2 THE CROWN COLONY OF HONG KONG 
Hong Kong became a Crown Colony within the British Empire with a constitution 
provided in the Letters Patent21 (and Royal Instructions) issued through the Privy 
Council in London.22  As noted above, this was the customary method the British 
                                                 
20  Edwards, Peter S. A. The Hong Kong Tax Structure:  Recent Tax Developments (1992) 4(3) CCH 
Journal of Asian Pacific Taxation, 17.  Although, this explanation over-emphasizes the importance 
of constitutional provisions as explanatory factors in the shaping of the Hong Kong Tax System, it 
does provide a good summary of nature of those provisions.  See below for a less doctrinal, 
explanation for the application and retention of the territorial principle in Hong Kong. 
 
21  See, Letters Patent, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letters_patent. 
 
22  The history and important operational aspects of Hong Kong’s constitutional documentation under 
British rule are explained well in Ghai, Yash, Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order (2nd ed.) 
(Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 1999) Chapter 1.  See, also, Hong Kong Basic Law, at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_Law_of_Hong_Kong.  See, also, Wesley-Smith, Peter, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in Hong Kong (Longman Asia, Hong Kong, 1994). 
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used for providing constitutional underpinnings to colonies like Hong Kong.23  
Such colonies remained subject to the operation of the direct application of UK 
law in certain circumstances and their own law making powers were limited, 
normally, to laws having effect within the specific colony.  Other larger, usually 
“white” dependencies within the British Empire, like the Australian Colonies, were 
provided with Westminster enacted constitutions and full Parliamentary systems 
of elected government – but their legislative powers remained restricted.24  The 
Letters Patent for Hong Kong, which were subject to a number of amendments, 
remained Hong Kong’s primary constitutional document until the change of 
sovereignty in 1997. 
 
Notwithstanding the addition of a fair amount of modern political embroidery 
(especially post WW II) the British retained the essence of this 18th century 
system of governance in Hong Kong right through until the handover, in 1997.25  
The task of governing British Hong Kong remained in the hands of a London 
appointed Governor working with a Civil Service notable for its very high level of 
political engagement.26  The fusion of politics and administration in the colonial 
                                                 
23  See, Letters Patent, at: http://85.1911encyclopedia.org/L/LE/LETTERS_PATENT.htm. See, also, 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-3708.pdf. 
 
24  For a typical example, see, Victoria (Australia) at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victoria_%28Australia%29. 
 
25  This same system has been used to form the primary HKSAR governance institutions which are 
embodied in the Basic Law. 
 
26  An alternative meaning given for the term “bureaucracy” in the Chambers 21st Century Dictionary 
(Chamber, Edinburgh, 1996) is “a country governed by officials”.  Hong Kong was, and still 
largely is, a bureaucracy in this sense.  For further discussion of the structure and operation of 
Hong Kong’ system of government see, Loh, Christine and Cullen, Richard, Political Reform in 
Hong Kong (2005) 14, Journal of Contemporary China, 147. 
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model of government downplayed the importance of politics and political 
participation in policy-making.  At the same time, the top layer of the Civil Service 
was in fact politicized as it also effectively played a political role.  
 
The governance system that ultimately evolved in Hong Kong under British rule 
was something of a hybrid – part Presidential, part Parliamentary and embedded 
in a colonial tradition.  Like the US, Hong Kong placed a great deal of power 
outside the legislature.  In British Hong Kong, power rested in the hands of the 
Governor. That said the dominant influence has been the UK Parliamentary 
tradition.  This explains why Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo) has been 
able, over time, to build a de facto capacity to hold government to account in a 
partly-Parliamentary manner. 
 
Despite the lack of democracy, Hong Kong was allowed, post WW II, to develop, 
under British rule, into the freest society in East Asia.  The press and the media 
generally were able to flourish27 and the Rule of Law, implemented primarily 
through an independent Judiciary, put down deep roots.28   
 
2.3 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE HKSAR 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
27  Bonnin, Michel, The Press in Hong Kong – Flourishing but Under Threat (1995) 1 (September) 
China Perpectives, 48. 
 
28  See, Ghai, Yash, Praise is not enough, South China Morning Post, March 22, 1998.  See, also: 
Jones, Carol, Politics Postponed in (Jayasuriya (ed.)) Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia 
(Routledge, London, 1999). 
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Currently, the HKSAR has what might best be described as a US-style, 
Presidential system of government (separated Executive and Legislature), 
heavily decorated with time-honoured colonial characteristics.  This is the system 
inherited from the British.  What Hong Kong does not have, despite more than 
150 years of British rule, is a UK-style, Parliamentary system of government 
(Executive fully integrated with and answerable to the Legislature).  Under the 
Basic Law, Hong Kong’s post-1997 mini-Constitution, the HKSAR leader, the 
Chief Executive (CE), is still selected/elected by an 800 member Election 
Committee rather than by universal suffrage.  None of the members of this 
Government are elected; they are all appointed (as is the Chief Executive) by 
Beijing.  The HKSAR Legislature – LegCo - comprises a single house with 60 
members.  Half of LegCo is, today, elected using a system of universal suffrage.  
All adult permanent residents of the HKSAR are eligible to vote for these 30 
LegCo members, who are chosen using a multi-seat, proportional representation 
electoral system.  The remaining 30 LegCo members are elected by Functional 
Constituencies (FCs), another British inheritance.  Several FC members stand 
unopposed in each LegCo election, due mainly to the extremely narrow franchise 
(below 500 voters) applying in certain FC seats.  For all FCs, the franchise is 
very small compared to the franchise applying to directly elected LegCo seats.29 
 
                                                 
29  For a recent detailed overview of the operation of Hong Kong’s current political system since 
1997, see: for example, Lai, Carine and Loh, Christine, From Nowhere to Nowhere (Civic 
Exchange, Hong Kong, 2007).  For a thorough review of the operation of the Functional 
Constituency system see: Loh, Christine and Civic Exchange (eds) Functional Constituencies 
(Hong Kong University Press, 2006).   See, also, Cullen, Richard, Hong Kong: The Making of a 
Modern City-State (2006) 13 Murdoch E-Law Journal, 24, at: 
https://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/issues/2006/1/eLaw_Cullen_13_2006_03.pdf.   
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The Basic Law sets out the way in which the HKSAR is to be administered for 50 
years beyond 1997.  It promised that the socialist system and policies in the PRC 
will not apply to the HKSAR under the doctrine of “One Country Two Systems”.30  
This doctrine provides that, although Hong Kong will become part of the PRC 
(One Country), it will retain a high degree of autonomy so as to maintain its 
current political economy (Two Systems).31  In other words, while the PRC will 
continue to practise “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, Hong Kong is to 
continue the practice of “capitalism with Chinese characteristics”.32 
 
Matters related to foreign affairs33 and defence34 fall within the ambit of the 
Central People’s Government in the PRC but Hong Kong has full management 
responsibility over many other matters.  For example, the HKSAR shall: 
x maintain its status as an international financial centre;35 
x maintain its status of a free port;36 
x issue passports;37 
x maintain trial by jury;38 
                                                 
30  Article 5, Basic Law. 
 
31  Cullen, Richard, Stability and Prosperity in Hong Kong:  A Palette of Influences in (Taylor (ed.)) 
Asian Laws Through Australian Eyes (1997) 186. 
 
32  Ibid. 
 
33  Article 13, Basic Law  
 
34  Article 14, Basic Law  
 
35  Article 109, Basic Law. 
 
36  Article 114, Basic Law . 
 
37  Article 154, Basic Law. 
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x formulate its own monetary and financial policies;39 
x issue Hong Kong currency, backed by a 100 per cent reserve 
fund;40 and 
 
x retain its tax law regime.41 
 
The Basic Law also prescribes the legislative systems which are to apply in the 
HKSAR.  Article 8 provides that the laws in force in the HKSAR shall be the Basic 
Law and guarantees the continuation of Hong Kong’s Legal System: 
The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules 
of equity ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be 
maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any 
amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region. 
 
Thus, the Common Law based on judicial precedents and the Ordinances that 
                                                                                                                                                 
38  Article 86, Basic Law. 
 
39  Article 110, Basic Law. 
 
40  Article 111, Basic Law.  The legal tender in Hong Kong is the Hong Kong Dollar (HKD), which 
has been linked with the US Dollar (USD) at the fixed rate of approximately HKD7.80 to  USD 1 
since October 1983.  The aim of this link has been to maintain long-term monetary stability.  The 
linked exchange rate system requires both the stock and flow of the monetary base to be fully 
backed by foreign reserves.  This means that any change in the monetary base is fully matched by 
a corresponding change in foreign reserves at a fixed exchange rate.  There is no foreign exchange 
control in Hong Kong.  The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (‘HKMA’) is the government 
authority with responsibility for maintaining currency and banking stability.  When the three note-
issuing banks (Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd, Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd and 
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd) issue banknotes, they are required by law 
to purchase certificates of indebtedness, which serve as backing for the banknotes issued, by 
submitting an equivalent amount of USDs at the above rate to the HKMA for the account of the 
Exchange Fund, a fund established to hold the backing to the note issue.  HKD banknotes are 
therefore fully backed by USD deposits held by the Exchange Fund.  Conversely, when HKD 
banknotes are withdrawn from circulation, certificates of indebtedness are redeemed and the note-
issuing banks receive back an equivalent amount of USDs from the Exchange Fund.  See Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority, Guide to Hong Kong Monetary and Banking Terms (3rd ed,) (2006) at: 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/public/ghkmbt/BT_eng.pdf> at 30 September 2007.  See, also, 
Greenwood, John, Hong Kong’s Link to the US Dollar (Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 
2008). 
 
41  Article 108, Basic Law. 
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were in force before 1 July 1997 remain applicable after the transfer of 
sovereignty to China.  One significant formal change was made to the judicial 
appeals system.  The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) was established to 
replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) 
as the court of final adjudication.42 
 
The Basic Law, allows, but does not mandate, significantly enhanced 
democratization within the HKSAR.43  This political reform process has 
essentially stalled since 2004.44  It is widely expected, however, that reform will 
eventually come.   
 
The Basic Law itself promises that the ultimate aim is for both the CE of the 
HKSAR and all of LegCo to be elected by universal suffrage.45  The Basic Law 
                                                 
42  Article 81, Basic Law. 
 
43  See: Article 45 and Annex 1 of the Basic Law (re election of the HKSAR Head of Government 
(the Chief Executive)) and Article 68 and Annex 2 of the Basic Law (re election of the HKSAR 
Legislative Council (LegCo)).  
 
44  On July 1, 2003, over 500,000 people marched peacefully through Hong Kong’s streets to protest 
at the less than optimal performance of the second (Beijing-appointed) HKSAR Government led 
by C.H. Tung.  All agree that this was a major political turning point for Hong Kong.  Several of 
Mr Tung’s Ministers (called Principal Officials) stepped down after the march – and he himself 
resigned early in 2005, to be replaced, for the balance of his term, by his Chief Secretary (and 
second in charge) Donald Tsang.  In April 2004, the National People Congress Standing 
Committee (NPCSC) in Beijing controversially used their power under Article 158 of the Basic 
Law to issue an interpretation to the effect that no significant democratization for the selection of 
the CE in 2007 nor for the 2008 LegCo elections would be allowed by Beijing.  These events – 
including the use of Article 158 – are reviewed in Cullen, Richard, The Rule of Law in Hong 
Kong (monograph) at: http://www.civic-exchange.org/publications/2005/rolawe.pdf.  For a 
comprehensive analysis of the development and consolidation of Hong Kong’s system of non-
elected government, see: Ghai, op. cit. note 22.  See, also: Goodstadt, Leo F., Uneasy Partners 
(Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 2005); and Miners, Norman, The Government and 
Politics of Hong Kong (5th ed.) (Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1991). 
 
45  See: Articles 45 and 68 and Annexes 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. 
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implies that some level of significant advancement towards that goal might have 
been expected by 2007.46  As matters have transpired, there has been no 
significant advancement by 2007, leaving the highly limited form of democracy 
outlined above in place. 
 
The scope for some level of significant reform of the system for choosing the CE 
of the HKSAR has been enhanced following the announcement, in December, 
2007, by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) of the 
PRC, of a conditional timetable for the introduction of universal suffrage within 
the HKSAR.  The NPCSC made the announcement in Beijing in late December, 
2007.  The NPCSC said that universal suffrage could be implemented in time for 
the CE election in 2017.  This proposal is conditional in that its implementation 
depends all of the conditions in Annex I of the Basic Law being satisfied - 
including the securing of a two-thirds majority, supporting vote in LegCo.  The 
scope for some level of significant reform of the LegCo electoral system (in 
addition to possible CE election reform) has also emerged from the official 
discussion following the NPCSC decision of December 2007.  It seems clear 
from these discussions that the NPCSC, while ruling out universal suffrage for 
LegCo in 2008 and 2012 will countenance such a reform for the LegCo elections 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
46  Annexes 1 and 2 of the Basic Law each refer to the possibility of such advancement by 2007. 
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due in 2020 (subject to compliance with the provisions of Annex II in the Basic 
Law).47 
 
The NPCSC announcement of this timetable was much more solemn than 
celebratory: the HKSAR was soberly encouraged to appreciate this important 
dispensation.  That said, December 29, 2007 may still be remembered in history 
as the first day on which the CCP ever agreed to a level of increased Western-
style democracy anywhere within its borders.48 
 
                                                 
47  See, Yeung, Chris, Beijing keen to keep edge over democrats, Sunday Morning Post, January 6, 
2008, 10.  
 
48  The NPCSC’s decision, made public on December 29, 2007, followed the submission of a Report 
to the NPCSC in accord with the second Article 158 Interpretation  (see note 44 above) by the CE 
in mid-December, 2007.  This Report followed on from the issuance of a Green Paper on 
Constitutional Reform by the HKSAR Government and resulting consultations (Public 
Consultation on Constitutional Development, at: http://www.cmab-
gpcd.gov.hk/en/consultation/index.htm).  See: Wong, Albert, Leung, Ambrose and Fung, Fanny 
W. F., Tsang’s 2020 Vision, Sunday Morning Post, December 30, 2007, A1; Wong, Albert, 
Leung, Ambrose and Cheung, Gary, 2017 suffrage goal hinges on progress by 2012, HK told, 
Sunday Morning Post, December 30, 2007, A2; Ching, Frank, Now comes the hard work on 
elections, South China Morning Post, January 1, 2008, A10; Yeung, Chris, Beijing keen to keep 
edge over democrats, Sunday Morning Post, January 6, 2008, 10; and Cheung, Anthony B.L., 
Take 2017 as a positive target for democratization, Newsletter, January, 7, 2008. 
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3.0 REVENUE REGIME EVOLUTION 
3.1 FINANCING THE COLONIES 
A heavy reliance on land-related revenues (wherever possible) within the British 
Colonies was well established as a key public finance measure by the early 19th 
century.  In essence, this approach sought to fund the running of many British 
Colonies by relying, primarily or significantly, on the disposal of (appropriated or 
discount-purchased) Crown land by Colonial Governments.49  It appears the 
policy was developed in London through the Colonial Office in response to the 
unhappy outcome arising from attempting to impose long-distance, London-
devised taxes in the British–American Colonies in the second half of the 18th 
century.50   
 
From a London point of view, these long-distance taxes were originally seen to 
be necessary to help cover local colonial expenditure in America on, for example, 
maintaining local military garrisons and the provision of public infrastructure in 
                                                 
49  See: Hooper, Keith C., Substance but not Form: Capital Taxation and Public Finance in New 
Zealand (1840 – 1859) at: www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3933/is_200311/ai_n9326384/; 
and, Harris, R. Cole, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance and Reserves in British 
Columbia (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2002) Chapter 1.  See, also, Pierce, 
Steven. Farmers and the State in Colonial Kano: Land Tenure and the Legal Imagination. (Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 2005). 
 
50  The position of Secretary of State for the Colonies was first established in 1768 in response to 
restiveness in the American Colonies.  By 1801, after the loss of those colonies a new position of 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was established.  In 1854 a fully separate Colonial 
Office was established under the now Secretary of State for the Colonies.  See, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_of_State_for_the_Colonies. 
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the American Colonies.  This tax approach culminated in the loss of those 
colonies and the establishment of the USA.51  
 
Another feature of colonial financing within the British Empire was a general 
avoidance of direct taxes (on, for example, salary, wages, profits or rents).  This 
was especially the case in the smaller British Crown Colonies (such as Hong 
Kong).52  It was felt that such taxes required an element of understanding as to 
why they were needed on the part of the individuals subject to said taxes and this 
understanding was usually widely lacking.53  This meant that there was a strong 
preference for collecting revenue from indirect taxes (for example, Customs 
Duties, Excise Duties) business licence fees, certain specific taxes (for example, 
Stamp Duties) – and from land sales and land usage charges.54  Ideally, these 
post American Revolutionary War, British colonial revenue systems were meant 
to be: colony-confined (no extra-territorial taxation); self supporting (but not 
“Mother-Country” supporting); and crafted to suit the local political-economy.55  
Where the “chief economic consideration” of a colony was trade with foreign 
countries then, it was argued, all trade-related taxes (especially, Import Duties) 
                                                 
51  See, American History Series: Britain Says No to 'No Taxation Without Representation, at: 
http://www.voanews.com/specialenglish/archive/2007-12/2007-12-05-voa2.cfm. 
 
52  Reinsch, Paul S. Colonial Administration (MacMillan, London, 1912), 92ff (Available at: 
http://books.google.com/books?id=uZJKdzOZ0pAC&pg=PA98&lpg=PA81&dq=colonial+taxatio
n&output=html&sig=80hpdTPdUtPuIQH1bClQdH57BQY. 
 
53  Ibid. 
 
54  Ibid. 
 
55  Ibid. 
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should be kept very low or be non-existent.  In some colonies (in Africa and the 
Pacific) poll taxes were used, also.56 
 
As various British Colonies developed more sophisticated economies – including 
more taxpayers blessed with a capacity to “understand” – a greater use of 
income-type (direct) taxes began to be imposed.  By 1922, an Inter-
Departmental-Committee in London had devised a “Model Ordinance” for 
imposing Income Tax.  This Model Ordinance drew on older precedents 
developed within the Australian and New Zealand colonies together with more 
recent laws from Canada and Australia. 57 
  
3.2 REVENUE REGIME DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG 
3.2.1 The Initial Phase 
Brown and Loh explain that the early development of what remains, to this day, a 
fundamental aspect of the operation of the Hong Kong Revenue Regime – land-
transaction revenues – derived from the fact that the very first Hong Kong 
Governments were able to assert that they owned the superior title to all land.58  
As noted earlier, British Hong Kong, initially (from 1841/42) consisted only of 
Hong Kong Island.  The Kowloon Peninsula was added in 1860.  The small 
                                                 
56  Eichelgrun, G., Income-Tax in British Colonies, (1948) 58 The Economic Journal, 128. 
 
57  Ibid. 
 
58  Brown, Stephen and Loh, Christine, Hong Kong: The Political Economy of Land (2002) 8-9 
<http://www.civic-
exchange.org/publications/2002/The%20political%20economy%20of%20land.pdf> at 
30 September 2007. 
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number of existing residents appear to have been mainly fishermen and families 
who lived on their boats plus some farmers.  In the eyes of the colonizers, it 
seems these locals lacked any firm claims over dry land areas.59  (When the 
British acquired the New Territories in 1898, the land rights of indigenous, long 
settled farming communities were recognized.60) 
 
Brown and Loh maintain that: 
At the outset, the administration decided that any interests in land sold to 
the private sector should be leasehold interests, rather than the freehold 
interests that could have been offered.  The only practical way of releasing 
land was through auction and the first auctions were held in the 1840’s.  
Commentators were already describing the frenetic bidding from the 
merchants and volatility of the market. To prevent abuse, the leasehold 
interests were granted with terms attached limiting the types of usage, 
which eventually became the key determinant in assessing the economic 
value of a piece of land. 
 
In the initial years after the founding of the colony, there was some 
discussion back and forth with Whitehall over what interests in land should 
be sold, whether freehold land should be released, and whether auction 
was the correct approach. Some twenty years after Hong Kong’s founding, 
an expedient decision was made. The British garrison in Hong Kong was 
not to be funded from Whitehall any longer, and government ownership of 
the land market in Hong Kong was proving to be a good revenue 
generator to help pay expenses.61 
 
 
                                                 
59  The total local population at the time of the occupation of Hong Kong Island by the British was 
less than 7,500.  See, Tsang, Steve, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong University 
Press, Hong Kong, 2006) 18. 
 
60  Brown and Loh, op. cit. note 57.  See, also, Nissim, Roger, Land Administration and Practice in 
Hong Kong (2nd. Ed.) (Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 2008) Chapters 1 and 2. 
 
61  Brown and Loh, Ibid. 
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Property rates were imposed on the new property (leasehold) owners also, 
almost from the outset.62  Another early (and continuing) impost introduced in 
Hong Kong was Stamp Duty, in 1866.63  The collection of Estate Duty effectively 
came to an end in the HKSAR in early 2006 but prior to this it had applied (albeit 
just on property situated within Hong Kong) from fairly early in the 20th century.64  
Excise Duties (for example on hydrocarbon oil; alcoholic drinks and tobacco 
products) have also been imposed in Hong Kong for a long time.65  An 
Entertainments Tax applied from 1930.66  Hong Kong was established as a Free 
Port, however, so there have never been any duties on goods entering Hong 
Kong.67  In fact, as soon as Captain Charles Elliot took possession of Hong Kong 
Island for the UK in January 1841, he proclaimed it to be a Free Port.68   
 
Another particularly grim source of revenue arose from fees and charges which 
applied to the opium trade.  (It was primarily disputation with China about 
Britain’s right to export opium that led to the First Opium War and the seizure of 
                                                 
62  Nissim, op. cit note 60, 11. 
 
63  Stamp Duty Ordinance (1866) – today, Stamp Duty Ordinance (1981).  See, also, Lou, Jianbo, 
Hong Kong: An Offshore Financial Centre in the Far East – Its Present and Future (1998) 52 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, 297. 
 
64  Estate Duty Ordinance (1932).  See, too, Abolition of Estate Duty – Inland Revenue Department 
Press Release, at: http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/ppr/archives/07042501.htm. 
 
65  See, Hong Kong: Customs Excise, at: 
http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/customs.pdf 
 
66  Entertainments Tax Ordinance (1930) and see, Hong Kong Legislative Council Minutes, March 
27, 1941, at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/1941/h410327.pdf. 
 
67  Minutes, ibid.  See, also, Hong Kong, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong. 
 
68  Tsang, op. cit. note 59, 21. 
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Hong Kong Island.69) For many decades after 1841 the Hong Kong Government 
benefited from this trade.  As late as 1917, up to one third of all revenues in Hong 
Kong were related to opium trading activities.70    
 
Another early source of revenue came through taxes and fees related to 
gambling.  The Hong Kong Jockey Club (HKJC) (previously the Royal Hong 
Kong Jockey Club) was founded in 1884 to run and promote horse racing.  In the 
post-WW II period it has become both Hong Kong’s biggest single taxpayer and 
also Hong Kong’s most significant charitable contributor.  It came to acquire 
monopoly rights over all legal gambling activities in Hong Kong.  The HKJC 
operates on a non-profit basis.71  Betting Duties were introduced by 1931.72 
 
                                                 
69  Tho’Mas, Kristianna, Opium War of 1838-42: How Britain Stole Hong Kong from China, at: 
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55/044.html. 
 
70  La Motte, Ellen N., The Opium Monopoly (MacMillan, New York) 1920) Chapter 7 (Hong Kong) 
at: http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/om/om7.htm (quoting official records).  Ellen La 
Motte, born in 1873 in Louisville, Kentucky, became a battlefield-nursing activist and journalist 
during WWI prior to spending some years, post-war, in East Asia.  She wrote extensively, and not 
un-controversially, on a wide range of social and political issues related to China and Chinese 
people, in particular.  She became key advocate during the inter-war years, for the ending of the 
legal trade (frequently by governments) in opium and its derivatives.  For a useful short overview 
of her remarkable, activist-life, see, Sugiyama, Keiko, Ellen N. La Motte, 1873-1961: Gender and 
Race in Nursing (2006) 17, Japanese Journal of American Studies, 129 (available at: 
http://wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp/jaas/periodicals/JJAS/PDF/2006/No.17-129.pdf).  This article also 
provides a helpful listing of many of LaMotte’s books and journal articles. 
 
71  See, Hong Kong Jockey Club – History, at: 
http://www.hkjc.com/english/corporate/corp_history.asp; and Hong Kong Jockey Club, at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong_Jockey_Club. 
 
72  Betting Duties Ordinance (1931) (see: http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/108/longtitle.html).  . 
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3.2.2 Income Tax Commences 
The first moves to introduce an income tax in Hong Kong came in December 
1938 when Governor Northcote established the Taxation Committee to look at 
the possible adoption of income taxation in the jurisdiction.  The committee 
recommended that an Income Tax be introduced.73 
 
In September 1939, when the UK declared war on Germany, the Governor 
pushed ahead with his plans to introduce an Income Tax in order to contribute to 
Britain’s war effort.  An Income Tax Bill designed to establish a single tax on all 
income was prepared.  The Chinese business community was “vehemently 
opposed in principal to any form of tax on income.  In particular, they were 
opposed to any tax at all on business profits.”  Their stance quickly attracted the 
support of the expatriate business community.74   
 
While the Governor could constitutionally override dissent within LegCo, he 
chose, instead, to convene a War Revenue Committee in order, “to cement the 
private sector’s position that it was only because of the war that extra revenue 
was required.” 75  It was also argued that British sensitivity was heightened by the 
fact that the revenues “were intended not to be spent for the colony’s own direct 
                                                 
73  Littlewood, Michael, Taxation Without Representation: The History of Hong Kong’s Troublingly 
Successful Tax System (2002) British Tax Review 212.  See, also, Littlewood, Michael, Tax 
Reform in Hong Kong in the 1970s: Sincere Failure or Successful Charade? in Tiley, John (ed.), 
Studies in the History of Tax Law (Hart, Oxford, 2004). 
 
74  Littlewood, 2002, ibid. 
 
75  Ibid. 
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benefit, but to be transferred to Britain.” 76  This committee proposed only a 
“partial income tax” and while the colonial authorities “regarded the committee’s 
proposal as barely adequate, even as a temporary wartime measure,” they 
nonetheless adopted the proposal.77 
 
The War Revenue Ordinance (1940) created a system of schedules, establishing 
three separate taxes on different categories of income - a Property Tax with a flat 
rate, a Salaries Tax with progressive rates and a Profits Tax with a flat rate for 
corporations and progressive rates for unincorporated firms.  The Ordinance 
exempted all offshore income from taxation.78   
 
In drafting the Ordinance, the War Revenue Committee copied, it is said, the 
schedular British income tax system introduced by Prime Minister Addington in 
1803, despite the fact that the British system itself had been reformed in 1910 to 
base tax liability on a taxpayer’s total income.  In Littlewood’s view, the 
committee chose to copy a system which Britain, “had effectively discarded thirty 
                                                 
76  Ibid. 
 
77  Ibid. 
 
78  Ibid.  This approach was entirely consistent with the 19th century tax policy – favouring sourced-
based taxation in the colonies – adopted by the British as their Empire developed.  See, Barker, 
William B., Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law to Promote Democratic Policy: The 
Example of the Move to Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2005) 109 
Pennsylvania State Law Review, 101, at 111.  See, also Easson, 2006, op. cit. note 1. 
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years earlier” because the representatives of business believed the separated 
schedular structure would reduce the possibility of future increases in tax rates.79   
 
The newly established tax system met significant criticism from the authorities in 
Britain and the War Revenue Committee was reconvened the following year.  
The War Revenue Ordinance (1941) replaced its predecessor and introduced 
small changes, including the introduction of an additional Interest Tax and an 
increase in the maximum rate of taxation.80  The new Ordinance, however, was 
short-lived.  In December 1941, six months after its adoption, Hong Kong was 
occupied by the Japanese. 
 
The new 1947 tax legislation, the Inland Revenue Ordinance (IRO) “retained the 
basic schedular structure and the restricted territorial ambit of the War Revenue 
Ordinance” of 1941.  Again, there were separate schedules for salaries, profits 
and interest originating in Hong Kong (with low tax rates). The new Ordinance 
differed in one important sense from its predecessor in that it introduced a 
system of “Personal Assessment” whereby an individual could choose to pay tax 
                                                 
79  Littlewood, 2002, ibid.  The perception amongst the business elites that the reliance on separate 
schedules would help forestall future tax increases may not have been well founded, however.   
Significant discrepancies in tax rates applicable to personal exertion, corporate and income from 
property have characterized Australia’s uniform tax system for almost 70 years now, for example.  
This level of discrepancy has produced strains and continues to attract criticism: “A large gap 
between the top personal income tax rate and the company tax rate creates an incentive to redefine 
personal income as company income” (Shorten, Bill, An Alternative Vision for Australia – 
Building our Nation, at: 
http://www.fabian.org.au/library/event_papers_2005/1118116108_23303.html).  Despite this long 
history of significant tax rate divergence, the Australian tax system has remained politically 
workable over many decades, however.  See also, Sorensen, Peter, Birch, The Nordic Dual Income 
Tax – In or Out? at: http://www.econ.ku.dk/pbs/diversefiler/oecddual.pdf. 
 
80 Littlewood, ibid. 
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(at progressive rates) on his or her total income, rather than use the strict 
schedular system.81  
 
Since 1947, the IRO has been formally re-examined on three occasions, in 1954, 
1968, and 1976, by Review Committees.  Yet, no major alterations have been 
made to the taxation system.  In 1984, an amendment was finally introduced 
whereby “interest income of all types of taxpayers ‘arising through or from the 
carrying on’ of the taxpayer’s business in Hong Kong was deemed to arise in 
Hong Kong”.  The amendment received a hostile reception from the business 
community, however, and was quickly repealed in 1986.82   
 
The 1976 review committee made perhaps the most significant recommendation 
for reform when it suggested that Income Tax should be assessed on total 
income, eliminating the separated schedular system of assessment.  In 1978, the 
Government was still considering this recommendation but, by the following year, 
the authorities had decided not to pursue such a reform.  The Government’s 
decision was again, it would seem, influenced by the business community’s “firm 
and vociferous opposition to tax reform.”83   
 
                                                 
81  Ibid. 
 
82  Ibid. 
 
83  Littlewood-2004, op. cit. note 73. 
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3.2.3 Overview of the Current Revenue Regime 
As noted above, the British established Hong Kong as a Free Port which meant 
that goods could enter and leave free of any customs or similar duties.  This 
continues to be the case today.  Indeed, Hong Kong has long prided itself on its 
low and simple, Tax Regime.84  Direct taxes applied to business profits and 
earned income still remain amongst the lowest in the developed world.85 
 
The Tax Regime in the HKSAR today encompasses the following key features:86 
x A narrow taxation base; 
x Low taxation rates; 
x Separate schedules applying separately identified taxes to different 
classes of income – no general income tax. 
 
x No taxation of income derived from outside of Hong Kong regardless of 
the residence status of the taxpayer (source-based taxation). 
 
x Simple and relatively stable taxation laws; 
x Retention of Stamp Duties in the system; 
x Almost no use of Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs);87 
x Comparatively constrained government spending; 
                                                 
84  Reynolds, Alan, Hong Kong’s Excellent Taxes, at: 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3793. 
 
85  See table at: http://www.forbes.com/global/2005/0523/024chart.html.  See also, table at: 
http://invest.vic.gov.au/About+Melbourne/Doing+Business+in+Melbourne/Taxation.htm. 
 
86  This outline of the current Hong Kong revenue system summarises and updates a more 
comprehensive review of the taxes applying in the HKSAR, which can be found in Cullen, 
Richard, Revenue Law in Hong Kong: The Future in Wacks (ed.) The New Legal Order in Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 1999) Chapter 12. 
 
87  Hong Kong’s approach to DTTs has been changing since 1997, however, see discussion below 
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x Very little government borrowing; 
x Infrequent (until recently) deficit budgeting; and 
x Massive accumulated fiscal reserves. 
 
The main taxes imposed (using separate schedules) by the IRO are: 
x Profits Tax; 
x Salaries Tax; and 
x Property Tax. 
 
Profits Tax, the most important tax in terms of revenue raised, is imposed by Part 
IV of the IRO.  The crucial practical and legal issue is source: only profits which 
can be shown to have (or which, in a few limited cases, are deemed to have) a 
source in Hong Kong are subject to profits tax.  As the discussion above 
demonstrates, the adherence to this source rule has been driven, to a large 
extent, by the desire of businesses, at all levels, to use Hong Kong as a base 
from which to operate without incurring tax on any offshore operations.88  The 
operation of the source principle in Hong Kong has been the subject of much 
                                                 
88  The motivation for retaining a source-based taxation system dates back to Hong Kong’s original 
status as a Free Port.  This status meant that Hong Kong was a place where trading business could 
be done, in the 19th century, without need to be concerned about taxation, either through Customs 
Duties or Income Tax.  As the need for some sort of Income Tax was grudgingly conceded just 
prior to and after World War II (see discussion above) the impact of the new Tax Regime was 
restricted from the outset by the incorporation of a source rule restricting the application of Profits 
Tax to profits arising within Hong Kong.  This sourced-based taxation regime has remained highly 
attractive to business as Hong Kong has, since the 19th century, made the transition from trading 
port, to manufacturing centre to, nowadays, a sophisticated, mostly service-based economy.   See, 
further, below and also, Easson, 2006, op. cit. note 1. 
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litigation.  Overall, its application has, historically, worked fairly well, however.89  
Hong Kong remains, in practice, the last remaining first-world jurisdiction to rely 
so heavily on a rule which excludes from the tax-net all profits which can be 
shown to have arisen outside of the jurisdiction.90 
 
Salaries Tax, which is imposed by Part III of the IRO, is also an important funding 
source.  Salaries Tax applies at progressive rates but it is subject to fixed 
                                                 
89  Halkyard, Andrew, The Hong Kong Tax Paradox (1998) 8 Revenue Law Journal 1, 20.  This 
article contains a useful summary of the key cases on source. 
 
90   Wong, Antonietta, Unpublished Thesis Manuscript (2005): “Jurisdictions using the territorial 
system to varying degrees include Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Singapore and Uruguay (see Thuronyi, Victor, Comparative Tax 
Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003) 287).  Singapore uses a form of source-based 
taxation whereby income ‘accruing in or derived from Singapore or received in Singapore from 
outside Singapore’ is taxed.  But the remittance basis has been effectively abolished in many 
situations.  From 1 June 2003, all foreign-source dividends, branch profits and services income 
received by a resident company are exempt from tax if the following conditions are met: (A) the 
income is received from a foreign jurisdiction with a corporate tax rate of at least 15 per cent in the 
year the income is received in Singapore; and (B) the foreign income has been subject to tax in the 
jurisdiction from which it was received.  From 1 January 2004, all foreign-source income received 
by resident individuals is exempt from tax, except through a partnership in Singapore.  Non-
residents are taxed on income accrued in or derived from Singapore.  See, Tan, Angela and Tan, 
How Teck, Singapore Master Tax Guide 2006/07 (25th ed,) (CCH, Singapore, 2006).  See, also, 
Halkyard, Andrew and Phua, Stephen, Lye Huat, Common Law Heritage and Statutory Diversion – 
Taxation of Income in Singapore and Hong Kong (Paper presented at the University of Hong 
Kong–National University of Singapore Law Symposium, Faculty of Law, University of Hong 
Kong, 11-12 December 2006) for a discussion of taxation of income in Singapore.  Malaysia uses 
another version of  territorial or domestic source-based taxation.  Tax is imposed on income 
‘accruing in or derived from Malaysia or received in Malaysia from outside Malaysia’.  However, 
income remitted by resident companies investing overseas is exempt from tax except for those 
carrying on banking, insurance, air and sea transport operations which are taxed on a worldwide 
basis.  From 1 January 2004, income remitted from overseas to Malaysia and received in Malaysia 
by resident individuals is also exempt from income tax.  Non-residents are taxed on income 
accrued in or derived from Malaysia, but not on income received in Malaysia from outside sources.  
See, CCH Tax Editors, Malaysia Master Tax Guide 2006 (23rd ed,) (CCH, Kuala Lumpur, 2006).  
South Africa only replaced its (UK-colonial) sourced-based tax system with a world-wide, 
residence based tax system following the collapse of the Apartheid system and the swearing in of 
South Africa’s first non-racial Government in 1994 (see, Barker, William B., Expanding the Study 
of Comparative Tax Law to Promote Democratic Policy: The Example of the Move to Capital 
Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2005) 109 Pennsylvania State Law Review, 101). 
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percentage “maximum” or “standard” rate on total taxable income.91  The 
Salaries Tax system is also source-based but the specified source rules in Part 
III (backed by case law and Departmental Interpretation and Practice Notes 
(DIPNs)) have meant that source is less of an issue than with Profits Tax.92 
 
The final schedular tax imposed by the IRO is Property Tax, which applies at a 
flat rate on rent received, less a statutory allowance of 20% for repairs and 
maintenance.  Corporations owning property are exempt from property tax – they 
pay Profits Tax on rents received instead. 
 
Stamp Duties imposed by the SDO raise around 10% of revenue depending very 
much on activity in the real estate and share markets.93  Betting Duty (on 
horserace, lottery and football betting) imposed by the Betting Duty Ordinance 
(1950), normally raise less than 10% of total revenue.  Estate and Gift Duties 
used, until recently, to be imposed by the Estate Duties Ordinance (1950) but 
these duties have recently been abolished.94  The yield from these duties has 
                                                 
91  2005/2006 Hong Kong Budget – Tax Rates Card, at: 
http://www.pwchk.com/home/eng/hktax_rates_card_2005.html.  It is often said that Hong Kong 
applies a “flat tax” to salaries and wages.  A true flat tax applies a fixed (flat) rate of tax typically 
on all income from zero-plus-one-dollar of income to infinite-dollars of income.  The Hong Kong 
salaries tax regime clearly (based on the description above) does not apply a flat tax in this way.  
The term “flat tax” is, however, often used as a (rather inaccurate) short-hand term in place of the 
more correct “maximum” or “standard” tax rate. 
 
92  Cullen, op. cit. note 86. See too, DIPN 10 The Charge to Salaries Tax at: 
http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/pdf/e_dipn10.pdf. 
 
93  See, Cullen, ibid; and Hong Kong Yearbook 2004- The Economy at, 
http://www.info.gov.hk/yearbook/2004/en/03_05.htm.  
 
94  See, Hong Kong – Abolition of Estate Duty, at: 
http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/3834909F-DAF6-403E-B6E9-
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been quite low for some time.95  Other comparatively minor sources of revenue 
include: property rates, various fees and duties (such as Excise Duties on 
tobacco, alcohol and petroleum products) utility charges and vehicle-related 
imposts.96  More significant, non-taxation sources of revenue include: investment 
and interest income (on fiscal reserves – see below), and direct land-transaction 
revenues, which are discussed in some detail below.97 
 
Despite this low tax regime, Hong Kong has still managed to provide public 
housing on a massive scale, to finance excellent transport and communications 
systems and comparatively sound education and health systems.98  At the same 
time, it has managed to amass public foreign currency reserves of over $US150 
billion.99  
                                                                                                                                                 
ED3DC84F088A/38385/HKAbolitionofEstateDuty.pdf.  The argument is that, by becoming one 
of the first jurisdictions in East Asia to remove Death/Estate/Gift Duties, Hong Kong will: help 
small Hong Kong businesses with cash flow problems; encourage increased location of assets in 
Hong Kong; and strengthen the HKSAR’s position as a location for regional fund managers (see, 
Abolition of estate duty helps promote HK's asset management business, at: 
http://www.fstb.gov.hk/eng/sfst/fstb19.html.) 
 
95  The Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants estimated that the EDO typically 
generated less than 1% of total government revenues (see, Estate Duty Review Consultation 
Document, at: 
http://www.hkicpa.org.hk/professionaltechnical/taxation/submissions/submission_201004.pdf.) 
 
96  Hong Kong Yearbook 2004- The Economy at, 
http://www.info.gov.hk/yearbook/2004/en/03_05.htm. 
 
97  Ibid. 
 
98  Cullen, op. cit. note, 86. 
 
99  Foreign Reserves, The Economist, January 24, 2008, at: 
http://www.economist.com/markets/indicators/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10568635.  These fiscal 
reserves are known, officially, as the Exchange Fund (see, too, footnote 40).  The Exchange Fund, 
today, essentially comprises: (A) the fiscal reserves (money saved from revenues raised but not 
spent over previous decades) of the Government’s General Revenue Account (roughly 40% of the 
Exchange Fund); and (B) the balance of government foreign currency reserves which back the 
Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) (roughly 60% of the Exchange Fund).  (Until 1998, a separate Land 
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The explanation for this apparent fiscal miracle has a number of facets.  First, the 
Hong Kong Government has had access to a revenue source rarely available in 
the modern age to most Governments: land.  Hong Kong is not large at around 
1,000 square kilometres.  And, until relatively recently, one had to live and work 
within this small area if one wished to make a life based in Hong Kong.100  From 
its inception, British Hong Kong did not allow (virtually) any sale of freehold 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fund was also retained by the Hong Kong Government.  In that year, the assets of the Land Fund 
were merged with the Exchange Fund – although the uses to which the Land Fund could be put 
remained restricted (primarily to capital expenditure).  See, Merger of Land Fund Assets into 
Exchange Fund, at: http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/1998/981117e.htm.)  The Exchange 
Fund is managed by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA).  The HKMA also manage the 
quasi-currency board pegging of the HKD to the US Dollar (USD).  That part of the Exchange 
Fund backing the HKD covers about 240% of all HKD notes and coins in circulation plus certain 
other securities.  It only covers about 30% of all HKD deposits, however.  A Currency Board fixes 
the exchange rate of Currency A (the HKD in this case) to an “anchor”, much stronger Currency B 
(the USD in this case) at a fixed rate and promises to convert cash and equivalent holdings of 
Currency A to Currency B at any time at the fixed rate (see, 
http://users.erols.com/kurrency/intro.htm).  It is argued that Hong Kong does not have a real 
Currency Board system because, amongst other things: (a) the HKMA manages the HKD other 
than in accord with strict Currency Board principles; and (b) the HKMA (unlike a true Currency 
Board) also operates like a Central Bank, in certain respects – by regulating the banking and 
financial systems.  See, further, An Introduction to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/ar2004/english/summary/summary_eng.htm; Hong Kong Yearbook 
2004 – Exchange Fund, at: http://www.info.gov.hk/yearbook/2004/en/04_12.htm; Lo, Chi, The 
Demise of the Hong Kong Dollar, at: 
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0303/commentary.html; and Greenwood, John, Hong 
Kong’s Link to the US Dollar (Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 2008).  The recent, 
unprecedented heavy reliance of the HKSAR Government on deficit financing (discussed in the 
text) has been paid for out of the Government’s fiscal reserves in the Exchange Fund.  Unlike in 
the case of accessing additional revenues through extra taxation, where the approval of LegCo is 
mandatory, the HKSAR Government can access the fiscal reserves without being compelled to 
seek LegCo approval.  
  
100  Since the 1980s, Hong Kong entrepreneurs have been transferring their manufacturing and other 
businesses to the Mainland (and especially to the adjacent Province of Guangdong).  Since the 
1990s, numbers of individuals have begun to commute to Hong Kong from the now vast city of 
Shenzhen directly across the border.  Shenzhen has seen its population grow from under 100,000 
to well over 7 million plus in less than three decades.  See, 
http://pdf.sznews.com/szdaily/2001/0418/1.htm. 
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land.101  All land was made available as leasehold land.  Moreover, the practice 
grew of restricting the availability of land for development.  This tended to drive 
up the price of land (towards the upper limits of what the market would accept) 
and revenue receipts.102   
 
The reliance on land-related revenues in Hong Kong follows a pattern, discussed 
above, established by the British by the early 19th century.  In essence, this 
system sought to fund the establishment of new British Empire Colonies by 
relying, primarily or significantly, on the disposal of (appropriated or discount-
purchased) Crown land by Colonial Governments.103 
 
                                                 
101  The Hong Kong Anglican Cathedral occupies freehold land.  Landholders in the New Territories 
have also historically been allowed, by the Government, to enjoy certain special rights to land 
based on ancestral rights which derive from membership of long established communities in the 
New Territories.  See, further, Nissim, op. cit. note 60. 
 
102  In 1995/96, as the “bubble” real estate market was approaching its peak during the last years of 
British rule, the Hong Kong Government derived some 32% of total revenues from land-related 
transactions (including sales, lease modification premiums and Stamp Duties – but not including 
Profits Tax and Salaries Tax arising directly from the real estate sector) see, Loh, Christine, The 
Government’s High-Land-Price Policy: Can Hong Kong People Afford it? at: 
http://www.citizensparty.org/housing/landpric.html.  See, too, Bell, Daniel A, Hong Kong’s 
Transition to Capitalism, at: 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3745/is_199801/ai_n8787332.  This heavy reliance 
on land transaction revenues in Hong Kong has, it would seem, been developed and introduced as 
a matter of practice – under the influence of the Colonial Office in London.  It has been found to 
work, so the practice has developed further.  The practice bears some resemblance to the theories 
propagated by Henry George, the 19th century American economist and social reformer who long 
advocated the introduction of a single tax on the unimproved value of all land to replace all other 
taxes.  See, http://www.answers.com/topic/henry-george.  See also, Smith, Julie P., Taxing 
Popularity: The Story of Taxation in Australia (Federalism Research Centre, Canberra, 1993) 18-
24.  A Henry George follower, Lizzie Magie, created the board game Monopoly in 1904 to 
demonstrate his theories (http://www.answers.com/topic/henry-george). 
 
103  See: Hooper, Keith C., Substance but not Form: Capital Taxation and Public Finance in New 
Zealand (1840 – 1859) at: www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3933/is_200311/ai_n9326384/; 
and, Harris, R. Cole, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance and Reserves in British 
Columbia (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2002) Chapter 1. 
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The entire land management system has become self-reinforcing and, arguably, 
financially addictive (for the Government).104  Government land policy has 
fostered one of the highest population densities of any major city in the world.  
Hong Kong has more skyscrapers, at over 7,400, than any other city on the 
planet, including New York.105 The majority of these are residential.  This density 
has allowed the provision of first rate transport and communications systems with 
greater speed and lower cost than would otherwise have been the case.  It has 
also, originally incidentally and now as a matter of policy, left the greater part of 
Hong Kong’s total area either subject to low density use or zoned as public 
(mostly park) areas.106   
 
Government policy has, predictably, had a significant upward impact on the price 
of land.  The Government, historically, could always, it seemed, rely on 
accessing additional revenue by leasing land long-term (as the sole supplier) into 
a market with ever rising prices.  The Government also takes a large fiscal bite 
from many secondary market transactions.  Strict usage conditions are stipulated 
in each government lease. If a developer purchases an old building wishing to 
                                                 
104  Brown, Stephen, Fung, Edward K. W., Loh, Christine, Uebergang, Kylie and Xu, Stephen, The 
Budget and Public Finance in Hong Kong, 34-35, at: http://www.civic-
exchange.org/publications/2003/BudgetReport.pdf. 
 
105  Tall Buildings, The Economist, April 9, 2005, 90. 
 
106  This does not mean that the Government has especially good “green” credentials.  On the contrary, 
successive Hong Kong Governments have displayed almost a mania for land reclamation from 
Victoria Harbour and beyond and for massive road and bridge building projects, for example.  See, 
further, Loh, Christine, Alternative Policy Address2005-2006, at, http://www.civic-
exchange.org/publications/2004/apa05e.pdf.  The fact that Hong Kong has taken a very high 
density approach to building (thus maximising government land-related revenues) has, by accident 
more than design, left much of its land area comparatively under-developed or undeveloped. 
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rebuild at say five times the height of the building to be replaced, the developer 
needs to obtain a variation to the purchased lease.  To get this, the developer 
has to pay a substantial “land premium” to the Government.  When one adds in 
the Profits Tax paid by developers and all the others involved in construction, 
transaction based Stamp Duties and Salaries Tax paid by those working in the 
sector, the HKSAR Government has continued to rely, in recent years, on land 
transaction related revenues for around 50% of its income.107 
 
There are, of course, market limitations on just how high land prices may be 
pushed by a government – even within a comparatively closed system such as 
that which has operated in Hong Kong.  That is, government cannot simply set 
any price for land it chooses.  If a price is too high, then buyers in the market 
simply will not respond.  Thus the Hong Kong Government has had experience 
with trying to sell commercial land where there were simply no takers.108  More 
recently, following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in mid-1997 the 
Government found it difficult to sell plots for residential development.  Subject to 
these fundamental constraints, successive Hong Kong Governments have 
played a significant role – over several decades – in creating conditions which 
have typically put upward pressure on land values. 
 
                                                 
107  Halkyard, Andrew, The Hong Kong Tax Paradox, (1998) 8 Revenue Law Journal, 1.  
 
108  The Hong Kong Government experienced serious difficulties in selling (leasing) land for 
commercial / industrial use in East Kowloon in the past, for example (discussion with Leo 
Goodstadt, September 30, 2005).  See, further, Goodstadt, op. cit. note 44, Chapter VI. 
 
 41
On the day after the handover, on July 2, 1997, the AFC began, when the Thai 
currency, the Baht, collapsed.  The AFC, combined with a range of other factors, 
triggered a huge collapse in asset values in Hong Kong.  These other factors 
included: (a) competency problems within the new HKSAR Government; (b) a 
currency, the HKD, pegged to the USD via an adapted Currency Board 
system;109 and (c) “bubble-economy” property values established during the final 
years of British rule.110 
 
Property prices began to collapse by 1998, shortly after the AFC hit.  By 2003, at 
the height of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) health crisis, 
residential property prices had fallen by about 70% from their bubble-market 
peak.  This, in turn, had a devastating impact on the revenue flow to the HKSAR 
Government.  The Government came to rely, over a period of years (and for the 
first time in living memory) on substantial deficit financing to meet recurrent 
expenditure.111  Mass market residential property prices have recovered 
significantly since the low point in 2003. Nevertheless, it is recognized that Hong 
                                                 
109  See footnote 99. 
 
110  See footnote 102. 
 
111  Crampton, Thomas, Hong Kong moves to curb deficit, International Herald Tribune, 9 January 
2003, at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2003/01/09/a7_6.php).  Note, this deficit spending has been 
funded by relying on Hong Kong’s massive reserves rather than through borrowing, reducing any 
adverse credit-rating impact significantly.  For a full review of the onset and impact of the SARS 
crisis in Hong Kong see, Loh, Christine and Civic Exchange (eds.) At the Epicentre: Hong Kong 
and the SARS Outbreak (Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 2004). 
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Kong’s narrow (land revenue related) tax base is a serious systemic fiscal flaw 
which needs to be fixed.112 
 
The Hong Kong Government has also historically been able to control 
expenditure quite effectively.  Cultural-economic reasons provide an important 
part of the explanation for this.  Briefly, Hong Kong people have long relied 
heavily on family and related networks to cope with a multitude of life’s 
exigencies.  Moreover, from the 1960s until the 1990s, Hong Kong maintained 
high economic growth rates sustaining full employment.  Also important was the 
long established reluctance of the Government to introduce more comprehensive 
programmes to tackle endemic social justice deficiencies within Hong Kong.113  
 
This combination of factors meant that the Government was put under (and 
placed itself under) significantly less pressure to develop a “welfare state” of the 
complexity typically encountered in most other developed economies.  What 
evolved is a system which has been described as the “residual welfare state”.114  
                                                 
112  See the HKSAR Government’s acknowledgement of this problem, Hong Kong Yearbook 2004- 
The Economy, Public Finance - Need to Broaden Tax Base, at: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/yearbook/2004/en/03_05.htm.  See, too: the proposals put forward by the 
British Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong at 
http://www.britcham.com/asp/ArticleDetail.asp?ArticleId=259; and  Brown, Stephen, Fung, 
Edward K. W., Loh, Christine, Uebergang, Kylie and Xu, Stephen, The Budget and Public 
Finance in Hong Kong, at: http://www.civic-exchange.org/publications/2003/BudgetReport.pdf. 
 
113  Goodstadt, op. cit. note 44. 
 
114  Hong Kong has been characterized by a somewhat paradoxical combination of heavy public 
involvement in financing and provision of direct public goods (for example, housing and general, 
educational and health infrastructures) while at the same time maintaining comparatively low 
overall government spending (compared to revenues).  See, Lee, Eliza, Wing-yee, The Politics of 
Welfare Developmentalism in Hong Kong, at: 
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The rate of public welfare spending has been increasing, however.  Hong Kong’s 
ageing population and rising social welfare expectations help explain a significant 
part of this growth.115  It is in the area of transfer payments (direct payments by 
government to individual citizens) that welfare budgets in other developed 
countries have seen the greatest growth and where they typically exceed direct 
public welfare spending (on the likes of housing, schools and hospitals) 
significantly.  Until the 1990s, Hong Kong was notable for its comparatively low 
level of transfer payments.116  From the mid-1990s, welfare spending of all kinds 
(including transfer payments) began to rise in Hong Kong.117  More recently, 
welfare spending has been cut back in Hong Kong as part of the efforts by the 
Government to curb its reliance on deficit financing of current expenditure.118  
Goodstadt argues that Hong Kong’s social spending policies have long been and 
remain deeply flawed – a position made all the more indefensible given the 
HKSAR’s massive fiscal reserves and familiarity with world-wide best practice.119 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/0/B764A113DEE628D4C125706D0032DA6
6?OpenDocument. 
 
115  Ibid.  
 
116  In 1997, less than 5% of public expenditure was devoted to transfer payments in Hong Kong, 
whilst 50% of public spending went on direct health, welfare, education and housing 
infrastructure.  In the US, at the same time, the comparable figures were around 33% and 22%, 
respectively.  See, It is already 1997 in Hong Kong, The Economist, 18 December 1997, 27. 
 
117  One commentator has estimated that broad social welfare spending increased by a total, nominal, 
236% between 1994 and 2004 (see, Dom, James A., Economic Freedom Must Lead the Way in 
Hong Kong, at: http://www.cato.org/dailys/11-27-04.html). 
 
118  Lee, op cit. note 114. 
 
119  Goodstadt, op. cit. note 44. 
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Another factor of some importance is the HKJC.  The HKJC is a not-for-profit 
organisation which has long held a monopoly granted by the Government to run 
all legal gambling activities in Hong Kong.  In 2005-2006 the HKJC had a 
turnover of around US$13 billion.120  The HKJC typically contributes over 10% of 
HKSAR Government revenues in the form of betting duties and other taxes.121  
Also significant is the major public spending programme of the HKJC based on 
its operating surpluses.122  Hong Kong is dotted with hospitals, educational 
establishments and a substantial number of other public facilities all funded in full 
or in part by the HKJC.123 
 
What this review demonstrates is that Hong Kong has, for decades, maintained a 
remarkable reliance on a distinct schedular taxation derived, originally, from the 
early 1800s UK income tax system.  Moreover, profits or income arising outside 
of Hong Kong are not subject to tax within the HKSAR.  In relying so heavily on 
the use of both separately operating schedules and source-based taxation as 
fundamental principles, Hong Kong is in company, in 2005, with a small minority 
of other jurisdictions.  Countries such as Belgium, Colombia, Croatia, and Mexico 
                                                 
120  See, 2005-2006 Season End Results-Hong Kong Jockey Club, at: 
http://www.hkjc.com/english/corporate/corp_operation_05-06_results.asp. 
 
121  See, Lovelock, Peter and Grant, Ken, Hong Kong Chronicles, at: 
http://english1.e21times.com/asp/fd.asp?r=974. 
 
122  See, Strengthening Philanthropy in the Asia Pacific: An Agenda for Action – Background 
Paper:Hong Kong, at: http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/APPC.HK.pdf. 
 
123  All of this expenditure has helped keep the Government’s own spending under control. 
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have now moved from a schedular system to widen the tax base in each case.124  
Furthermore, unlike most other developed jurisdictions, Hong Kong imposes: no 
tax on capital gains;125 only very limited taxes on fringe benefits126 and; no 
general tax on the provision of goods and services.127  A key reason Hong Kong 
has been able not only to fund public spending, but to put away substantial fiscal 
reserves, whilst relying on such a taxation system, has been the major revenue 
streams from land-related transactions, where the Government deliberately 
positioned itself as a monopoly supplier of this vital “commodity”.  Moreover, in 
difficult years, such as those after 1997, when revenues have fallen short of 
spending, the Government has been readily able to cover shortfalls by accessing 
                                                 
124  Holmes, Kevin, The Concept of Income – A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis (IBFD, Amsterdam, 
2001) 28-29.  Holmes notes, as examples of schedule-based systems, Hong Kong, Belarus, Sudan 
and the UK.  In the case of the UK – and unlike Hong Kong – although the schedules remain in 
the form, as a matter of practice, a single income tax is applied to collective income, see: Tax in 
England, at: 
http://www.adviceguide.org.uk/index/life/tax/income_tax/index/life/tax/income_tax.htm; and 
Income Tax,at: http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Income:tax.html..  
 
125  Section 14 of the IRO, which imposes Profits Tax, specifically excludes capital profits from 
assessment of Profits Tax.  Section 14 does tax “trade”, however, and the case law – and the IRO 
definitions section (Section 2) – stipulate that this term includes “an adventure in the nature of 
trade”.  Thus, one-off transactions can still be regarded as “trading” in certain circumstances 
(normally fairly rapid re-selling of real estate) and taxed accordingly.  See, further, Cullen, op. cit. 
note 86. 
 
126  Reduced taxes apply to the provision of employee housing and certain education and share 
benefits.  Otherwise, the “cash-convertibility” rule applies.  This rule, which is based on old 
English case law, provides that provided an employee fringe benefit is not paid in cash and cannot 
be converted to cash by the employee, then it will not be considered a perquisite which can be 
taxed as part of a salary (see, further, Cullen, ibid). 
 
127  It is arguable that the Hong Kong Government’s long established, high land price policy has 
imposed a “de facto” Consumption Tax on all consumers in Hong Kong.  Inflated land prices 
(which have benefited the Government most of all) have driven up the costs of doing almost every 
sort of business in Hong Kong because of high rents or high initial land-purchase costs.  These 
input costs have then been passed on to all consumers as prices for goods and services have been 
set.  The introduction of a GST in Hong Kong is now a widely discussed new tax option (see 
discussion below and, also,: The HKSAR Government may beat its target by balancing the books 
before 2008/2009, PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts, at: 
http://www.pwchk.com/home/eng/pr_170105.html; and Ching, Stephen, GST and Government 
Bond, at: http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/hkcer/hkcer040601.htm). 
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accumulated reserves – a process which has not required LegCo spending 
approval. 
 
In summary, Hong Kong has survived and, indeed, thrived, into the 21st century 
whilst relying on a Revenue Regime which would not have been out of place in 
the 19th century. 
 
3.2.4 The Fiscal Firewall 
A number of the main features of Hong Kong’s new mini-Constitution, the Basic 
Law, are explained above, in Section 2.3.  As we saw, one crucial role of the 
Basic Law is to provide for a high degree of separation of the HKSAR from the 
Mainland (Two Systems) within the PRC (One Country).  Particular effort has 
been put into drafting provisions in the Basic Law which are designed to install a 
constitutional, “fiscal firewall” between the two Revenue Regimes. 
 
Article 106 of the Basic Law provides that Hong Kong is to have its own 
independent finances and prohibits the PRC from raising taxes in Hong Kong or 
sharing the HKSAR’s tax revenue: 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have independent 
finances. 
 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall use its financial 
revenues exclusively for its own purposes, and they shall not be handed 
over to the Central People’s Government. 
 
The Central People’s Government shall not levy taxes in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region. 
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Moreover,  Article 108 provides that: 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall practise an 
independent taxation system. 
 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, taking the low tax 
policy previously pursued in Hong Kong as reference, enact laws on its 
own concerning types of taxes, tax rates, tax reductions, allowances and 
exemptions, and other matters of taxation. 
 
 
 
The Basic Law also stresses the need to preserve the prosperity and stability of 
Hong Kong.128 
 
Ten years-plus after the handover, one would have to say that the policy of 
separating the two Revenue Regimes has been followed practically to the letter.  
Both economies (and the participants in those economies) operate, as a matter of 
routine, as if there are two entirely separate Tax Systems.  This is recognized, too, 
in the Double Tax Arrangement in place and applying to the Tax Systems (see, 
further, below).  Moreover, this separation is well recognized outside of the PRC 
and the HKSAR, for example, by the Australian Taxation Office.129 
 
                                                 
128  Preamble, Basic Law. 
 
129  See, Australian Tax Office, Taxation Ruling TR97/19, Income Tax: Tax Implications of 
Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty over Hong Kong. 
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3.2.5 Double Tax Treaties 
Due to the territorial source basis of taxation, non-residents in Hong Kong are 
taxed at source and withholding tax, generally, does not apply.130  As only three 
types of income with a domestic source are taxed under a separate system of 
schedules, there is notably less need for Hong Kong to seek to enter into a range 
of DTTs to deal with the allocation of taxing rights for different types of income 
and to require the residence jurisdiction to provide double taxation relief for any 
source taxation levied in accordance with the DTT.  However, Hong Kong is 
beginning to recognize certain trade-enhancing merits (discussed further below) 
of concluding DTTs  with its trading partners, and has entered comprehensive 
DTTs with Belgium,131 Thailand132 and Luxembourg.133  For Hong Kong, the 
Belgium, Thailand and Luxembourg DTTs apply to any person who is resident in 
Hong Kong.  The term ‘person’ includes an individual, a company, an estate, a 
trust or a partnership.134  Residence is not defined in the Hong Kong-Belgium 
                                                 
130  A quite limited number of payments to an offshore company are deemed to have a source in Hong 
Kong, and withholding tax applies even if the company does not carry on any business in Hong 
Kong.  See, for example, Sections 15(1)(a), 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(ba) of the IRO. 
 
131  See the Agreement Between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (entered into force 
October 2004) (Hong Kong-Belgium DTT). 
 
132  See the Agreement Between the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (entered 
into force December 2005) (Hong Kong-Thailand DTT). 
 
133  Agreement Between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (signed on 2 
November 2007) (Hong Kong-Luxembourg DTT). 
 
134  Article 3, Hong Kong-Belgium DTT; Article 3 Hong Kong-Thailand DTT; Article 3 Hong Kong-
Luxembourg DTT. 
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DTT, but any person is liable to tax “by reason of his domicile, residence, place 
of management or incorporation or any other criterion of a similar nature”.135  
Residence is defined in both the Hong Kong-Thailand and Hong Kong-
Luxembourg DTTs and means, in the case of companies, a company 
incorporated in Hong Kong or a company not incorporated in Hong Kong but 
being normally managed or controlled in Hong Kong.136  For the first time, the 
concept of residence has a limited but key role to play in Hong Kong’s territorial 
Taxation System. 
 
Hong Kong also has entered limited treaties relating to airline and shipping 
income,137 and a comprehensive Double Tax Arrangement (DTA) with Mainland 
China covering business profits, employment income, capital gains as well as 
passive income such as dividends, interest and royalties.138  The DTA is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
135  Article 4, Hong Kong-Belgium DTT 
 
136  Article 4, Hong Kong-Thailand DTT; Article 4; Hong Kong-Luxembourg DTT. 
 
137  There are a number of treaties relating specifically to airline and shipping income.  Hong Kong 
has reached bilateral air services agreements for airline income with Bangladesh, Canada, Croatia, 
Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, the Republic of 
Korea, Kuwait, Macao Special Administrative Region, Mauritius, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.  Hong Kong has also 
entered into double taxation relief arrangements for shipping income with Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US.  Agreements covering both airline and shipping income 
have been concluded with Singapore and Sri Lanka.  See, further: Doggart, Caroline, Tax Havens 
and Their Uses (Economist Intelligence Unit, Research Report, 2002); Olesnicky, Michael, 1997 
Asia-Pacific Tax Update – Hong Kong (1997) 15 Tax Notes International, 2143; Blanco, Evan and 
Roels, Jan, Hong Kong Signs Its First Comprehensive Income Tax Treaty (2004) 33 Tax Notes 
International, 227; and Lai, David T. W., Interpreting Double Tax Agreements in Hong Kong 
(2007) 37 Hong Kong Law Journal, 137.   
 
138  See the Arrangement Between the Mainland of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect 
to Taxes on Income (entered into force December 2006) (Hong Kong-China Double Tax 
Arrangement).  See, too, Second Protocol to the Arrangement for the Avoidance of Double 
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necessary to allocate taxation rights between the two sides due to increasing 
cross-border commercial activities and each side administering a different 
Taxation System.  The concept of permanent establishment (PE) is used in the 
DTA to determine where tax is to be imposed.  In determining the profits of a PE, 
deductions are allowed for expenses incurred for the purposes of the business of 
the PE including executive and general administrative expenses.139  However, 
any royalties (paid by the PE to the head office for the right to use intellectual 
property), commission or remuneration for provision of specific service or 
management, as well as interest on moneys lent to the PE (except for banking 
enterprises) are not deductible. 
 
The DTA provides a number of incentives for investing in the PRC through a 
holding company in Hong Kong.  A Hong Kong company no longer has to pay 
any PRC Capital Gains Tax (CGT) when it sells shares in a PRC business, 
unless the Hong Kong company holds 25 per cent or more of the shareholding of 
the Mainland enterprise or the assets of the Mainland enterprise comprise mainly 
immovable property situated on the Mainland.140  The withholding tax rates on 
dividends, interest and royalties earned from investments in Chinese companies 
                                                                                                                                                 
Taxation signed with the Mainland, signed by the Secretary for Financial Services and the 
Treasury of the HKSAR on January 20, 2008.  Note the terminology – this is a “Double Tax 
Arrangment” – not a Double Tax Agreement, still less a Double Tax Treaty.  Agreements and 
Treaties are signed by separate, sovereign jurisdictions.  The HKSAR as a part of the PRC, is not 
separate in this sense, hence the use of the term Arrangement. 
 
139  Article 7, Hong Kong-China Double Tax Arrangement. 
 
140  Article 13, Hong Kong-China Double Tax Arrangement. 
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have been lowered to attract foreign capital and to promote Hong Kong as an 
international financial centre.141 
 
As to income from employment, so far as Hong Kong is concerned, a resident of 
the Mainland is chargeable to Hong Kong Salaries Tax on income from 
employment in Hong Kong if the period of stay in Hong Kong exceeds 183 days 
in the aggregate in a 12-month period.142 
 
                                                 
141  Under the previous Hong Kong-China Double Tax Arrangement signed in February 1998, the 
withholding tax rate for dividends, interest and royalties received by a Hong Kong company was 
10 per cent.  Under the new Arrangement signed in August 2006, the withholding tax rate for 
dividends is now down to 5 per cent, if the Hong Kong company holds 25 per cent or more of the 
capital of the Mainland enterprise.  Similarly, the withholding tax rate for interest and royalties 
received by a Hong Kong company is now reduced to 7 per cent.  See, also, Second Protocol to 
the Arrangement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation signed with the Mainland, January, 30, 
2008 on the definition of a “resident”. 
 
142  The basic charge to salaries tax is imposed by Section 8(1) of the IRO 1947 on income ‘arising in 
or derived from Hong Kong’.  In addition to this basic charge, the High Court Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v George Andrew Goepfert [1987] 1 HKLR 888, decided that there is a double test 
under Section 8(1): 
If during a year of assessment a person’s income falls within the basic charge to salaries 
tax under Section 8(1), his entire salary is subject to salaries tax wherever his services 
may have been rendered, subject only to the so-called ‘60 days rule’ that operates when 
the taxpayer can claim relief by way of exemption under Section 8(1A)(b) as read with 
Section 8(1B).  Thus, once income is caught by Section 8(1) there is no provision for 
apportionment … On the other hand, if a person, whose income does not fall within the 
basic charge to salaries tax under Section 8(1), derives income from employment in 
respect of which he rendered services in Hong Kong, only that income derived from the 
services he actually rendered in Hong Kong is chargeable to salaries tax.  Again, this is 
subject to the ‘60 days rule’.  Therefore, once Section 8(1) applies, there can be no claim 
for so-called time apportionment.  If a non-Hong Kong employment exists, then any 
income derived from that employment is liable to salaries tax under Section 8(1A) which 
brings to charge income derived from services actually rendered in Hong Kong.  See, 
also, Hong Kong, Inland Revenue DIPN 10 (revised), The Charge to Salaries Tax.  See, 
too, Second Protocol, ibid. 
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Though Hong Kong is now part of the PRC, it is excluded from, for example, the 
operation of the Australia-China DTT.143  The Australia-China DTT covers the 
Income Tax imposed under the laws of the PRC.144  The term ‘China’ means all 
the territory of the PRC, including its territorial sea, in which the laws relating to 
Chinese tax apply.145  Article 106 of the Basic Law provides that the PRC shall 
not levy taxes in Hong Kong.  Article 108 stresses that the HKSAR should follow 
the same territorial basis and low tax rates that previously existed in Hong Kong.  
Accordingly, the Commissioner of Taxation in Australia does not take the view 
that the HKSAR taxes would be “identical or substantially similar” to the taxes 
imposed in China to which the DTT applies,146 and the Australia-China DTT thus 
does not apply to taxes imposed by the HKSAR.147 
 
 
4.0 GLOBALIZATION AND THE REVENUE REGIME 
Right from its initial, somewhat unsteady beginnings in 1841, the Crown Colony 
of Hong Kong was shaped by the most powerful spur towards globalization of 
that era.  Towards the end of the 18th century, as Britain conceded the loss of its 
American Colonies, the British Empire seemed to be wobbling.  Within less than 
                                                 
143  See the Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with respect to Taxes on Income (entered into force 28 December 1990) (Australia-China DTT). 
 
144  Article 2, Australia-China DTT. 
 
145  Article 3, Australia-China DTT. 
 
146  Article 2, Australia-China DTT. 
 
147  See Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Ruling TR97/19, Income Tax:  Tax Implications of 
Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty over Hong Kong. 
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50 years, however, that same Empire was entering its period of maximum reach 
and ascendancy.  The globalized trade system of this era, pivoted around world-
wide colonies gathered into predominantly European-based Empires.  A 
fundamental tenet of British Empire ideology by this stage was the paramount 
need to foster international trade between London and the Empire, within the 
Empire and with the rest of the world.  (“Manchester Capitalism” is the name 
given to this system by one German commentator.148) 
 
Very shortly after Captain Charles Elliot raised the Union Jack149 over Hong 
Kong Island for the first time in January 1841, he proclaimed Hong Kong to be a 
Free Port.  As Tsang says: 
                                                
[Elliot] declared that “Her Majesty’s Government has sought no privilege in 
China exclusively for the advantage of British ships and merchants”.  This 
generous offer to open Hong Kong to traders of all nations including China 
was made in the light of the ascending might and rising economic power 
of early Victorian Britain.  These were such the free trade posed little if any 
threat to British supremacy in Chinese waters.150 
 
Thus, from the outset, the imperatives of globalization determined certain 
fundamentals of the Revenue Regime in the new colony.  Deprived of income 
from Customs Duties (normally a mainstay of 19th century colonial finances) the 
new Hong Kong Government quickly seized the opportunity, first to assert title to 
all land; and then to sell land-usage rights (by auction) in the form of a 
 
148  Sieren, Frank, The China Code (PalgraveMacMillan, Basingstoke, 2007). 
 
149  The “Union Jack” remains the most commonly used term for the Flag of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland (now Northern Ireland).  See, Union Flag, at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_Flag. 
 
150  Tsang, op. cit. note 59, 21. 
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government monopolized commodity.151  This system was a product, in part, of 
the hard-learning from the loss of colonies in America (yet more global-event 
influence).  It flourished elsewhere in the British Empire - but probably nowhere 
has its role as a revenue generator been so significant over such a long period 
as in Hong Kong (and now, still, in the HKSAR).  First private parties and then 
the Government, also, swiftly began filling in parts of Hong Kong’s (now) famous 
Victoria Harbour.152   
 
A great deal of Hong Kong’s trading success substantially depended for many 
years on the awful large scale shipment of opium to China by the British from 
India.  It was primarily disputation with China about Britain’s right to export opium 
that led to the First Opium War and the seizure of Hong Kong Island.153  The 
Hong Kong Government benefited directly from this trade through licence fees 
and other charges which applied.  As late as 1917, it is said, up to one third of all 
revenue in Hong Kong arose out of opium trading activities.154  
 
For the first 100 years in Hong Kong, the Government was able to manage not 
only without Customs Duties but also without need to resort to Income Tax.  
                                                 
151  In other places, salt and tobacco, for example, commonly were transformed into State monopolies 
and sold to fill State coffers.  Today, many States achieve similar ends selling raw petroleum 
resources. 
 
152  Nissim, op. cit. note 60, Chapter 6. 
 
153  Tho’Mas, Kristianna, Opium War of 1838-42: How Britain Stole Hong Kong from China, at: 
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55/044.html. 
 
154  La Motte, Ellen N., The Opium Monopoly (MacMillan, New York) 1920) Chapter 7 (Hong Kong) 
at: http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/om/om7.htm. 
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Local business people, both Chinese and expatriate, were bitterly opposed to 
any sort of tax on income and especially opposed to any tax on business 
profits.155  Apart from this internal resistance, the fact was that, with the minimal 
level of government services provided, the Colony was able to survive and 
indeed thrive without need to increase the very limited reach of its Tax System.  
The assortment of taxes like Stamp Duty, Estate Duty, Property Rates and 
Betting Duty, coupled with various fees and, particularly, the revenue from land 
transaction sales and imposts – plus revenue derived from the opium trade -
normally generated sufficient income to cover public expenditure.  The usually 
thriving economy was, of course, crucial to generating sufficient income from this 
very limited and, indeed, rather peculiar revenue base.156  The thriving economy 
was, in turn, primarily energized by Hong Kong’s role as a crucial Free Port 
within the British Empire (and the world-wide trading system).  In other words, the 
globalized economy of the time both crucially shaped the Revenue Regime – and 
helped sustain that same regime for decade after decade. 
 
Then came WWII.  The Japanese invaded the unstable, vulnerable new Republic 
of China in the early 1930s and occupied Manchuria in 1933.  By 1939, the 
Japanese occupied Guangdong Province, adjacent to Hong Kong.  
Notwithstanding this clear threat and even after the UK declared war on 
                                                 
155  Littlewood, Michael, The Legacy of UK Tax Law in Hong Kong, Paper presented at the “Legacy 
of UK Taxation Law Abroad Conference”, at The University of Hong Kong,  December 18, 2007.  
 
156  A series of punishing strikes organized from nearby Canton (today Guangzhou) in Mainland 
China in the 1920s (after the fall of the last Imperial (Qing) Dynasty in 1911-1912) severely  
tested the survival skills of the Colony, however.  See Miners, Norman, The Government and 
Politics of Hong Kong (5th. Ed.) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998). 
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Germany in 1939, resistance in Hong Kong to an Income Tax of any sort 
remained fierce.157  Finally, Hong Kong’s first Income Tax was introduced.  It 
applied only briefly in 1940 – 1941 and then was suspended.  The Japanese 
invaded Hong Kong on December 9, 1941, two days after they bombed Pearl 
Harbour.  Within three weeks, they had control of the entire Colony. 
 
Finally the Japanese were defeated, in 1945, and departed.  They left a 
shattered economy.  As devastated as that economy was, however, there was 
still, in the immediate aftermath of the war, a widely shared understanding that, if 
Hong Kong were to recover, it was most likely do so applying the same economic 
model which had dominated for the hundred years prior to the war.  That model 
emphasized, above all, trade engagement with the rest of the world.  That model 
had been shown to work best by combining a minimalist Tax System with very 
high levels of trade-based economic activity.   
 
After WWII, in 1947, the IRO commenced operation.  Again there was resistance 
to its (re)introduction, which was especially fierce from the Chinese business 
community.  But as the war ravaged Colony was in such desperate straits, the 
expatriate business elite reluctantly agreed to the re-instatement of a type of 
limited Income Tax.158  As before the war, though, it came in a form which 
borrowed very heavily from the 19th century UK Income Tax model.  It was 
                                                 
157  Littlewood, op cit. note 155. 
 
158  Miners, op. cit. note 44. 
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source based (its scope was confined, essentially, to the territory of the Crown 
Colony) tax rates were all kept notably low and no general Income Tax was 
allowed, rather separated specific taxes applied according to particular 
schedules.  Once more the development of Hong Kong’s Revenue Regime had 
been heavily constrained so as to fit, it was hoped, as well as possible into 
whatever new post-war, world trading (and political) order emerged.  
 
After the defeat of Japan in 1945, the Civil War in China, between Chiang Kai-
Shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) and the CCP led by Mao Zedong resumed.  By 1949, 
the defeated KMT had retreated to the island of Taiwan.  The new People’s 
Republic of China was proclaimed by the Communists on October 1, 1949.  
Hong Kong found itself, like it or not, with a front row seat at the Cold War. 
 
Over the course of the Cold War (from 1945 to 1989) Hong Kong experienced (or 
was caught up in to some degree) various regional crises including: the Korean 
War, the upheaval and famine of Mao’s infamous “Great Leap Forward” (1958-
1961)159; Mao’s even more ill-famed, “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” 
(1966-1976)160; and the Vietnamese War.  Perhaps the most severe proxy-
substantial-wars driven by the Cold War political order were those in Korea and 
Vietnam.  
 
                                                 
159  Great Leap Forward, Cambridge Paperback Encyclopedia (3rd ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999). 
 
160  Cultural Revolution, Ibid. 
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Although the People’s Liberation Army (of the CCP) was on the border with Hong 
Kong by 1949, no attempt was made to invade.  By 1950, China had entered the 
war on the Korean Peninsula on the side of North Korea.  This made any near-
term invasion of Hong Kong unlikely for several reasons.  First, the limited 
resources of the new PRC were already stretched by the war in the north-east.  
Also, the British were, by now, well dug in, in Hong Kong.  Next, the Korean War 
demonstrated, to Beijing, the advantage of having this British enclave in the 
south-west.  Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Western powers 
placed an embargo on the export of strategic goods to the PRC.  China, was, 
nonetheless, able to obtain some important supplies through Hong Kong.161 
 
Out of this experience grew a largely unspoken, mutual understanding between 
Beijing and London.  The essence of this understanding was that, provided Hong 
Kong did not become any sort of strategic threat to the PRC, the British presence 
there would be tolerated pro tempore.  The key elements of this modus vivendi, 
according to Norman Miners, included: no significant moves towards democracy 
in Hong Kong; no effective Taiwanese (that is, KMT) presence in Hong Kong; 
and no impediments to China participating in and profiting from the Hong Kong 
economy.162 
 
                                                 
161  Miners, op. cit. note 44. 
 
162  Ibid. 
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Under this arrangement, Hong Kong enjoyed a near continuous, significant 
growth in prosperity for a period of five decades following the end of WW II.  In 
1945, Hong Kong’s per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was, by some 
estimates, lower than that of India and Kenya.163  By 1992, Hong Kong’s per 
capita GDP had overtaken that of the UK.  By 2004, Hong Kong was ranked at 
23 in a global, “highest GDP per head” table, ahead of Canada and Australia.164  
Wealth distribution in Hong Kong remains very uneven; significant poverty 
persists.  But there is no denying that the City-State materially transformed itself 
over the decades following 1945, from a war ravaged colony of less than 
800,000165 to a leading international service centre with a population of some 7 
million.   
 
Crucial to this transformation was Hong Kong’s rapid, highly adaptive re-
integration into the new, post-Empire (Cold War influenced) world trading system.  
Initially, manufacturing for export was very successfully added to the traditional 
trading foundations of the economy.  At least two factors combined to drive this 
development.  First, much manufacturing talent fled Mainland China for Hong 
Kong following the creation of the PRC in 1949.  Next, the American-led trade 
embargo imposed on the PRC following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 
notably restricted Hong Kong – Mainland trade (though it did not stop it 
                                                 
163  Bartholomew, James, The Welfare State Made Britain Poor – extract from book at: 
http://www.moneyweek.com/article/593//the-welfare-state-made-britain-poor.html. 
 
164  Pocket World in Figures 2005 (The Economist – Profile Books, London, 2004), 28. 
 
165  See, http://www.demographia.com/db-hkhist.htm. 
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altogether).  This restriction on traditional China-entrepot-trade forced Hong Kong 
to seek fresh (manufacturing-based) trading opportunities.166  Later came tourism 
and a Vietnam War, rest and recreation role.  Increasingly, service industries 
(banking, legal accounting and the like) grew to be important and Hong Kong 
became a preferred location of regional headquarters for many transnational 
corporations.167  By this stage, Hong Kong’s basic financial and legal 
infrastructure (including a genuinely strong Rule of Law ethos) were both well 
established and well recognized.168 
 
In 1972, US President Nixon visited the PRC following the lifting, in 1971, of the 
US embargo on trade in non-strategic goods.  This signaled that Hong Kong’s 
historical role as an entrepot to China could once more resume.169  Commencing 
in 1978, China’s new post-Mao, Premier Leader, Deng Xiaoping, launched 
China’s whole-hearted economic reconnection with world with the “open-door” 
policy.170  Very quickly, Hong Kong entrepreneurs moved to take advantages of 
these changes – taking real risks as they did so – by shifting all manner of 
manufacturing facilities across the border into Guangdong Province and 
especially into the border, Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen.  As this process 
                                                 
166  Tsang, op. cit. note 59, Chapter 12. 
 
167  Ibid. 
 
168  Ibid. 
 
169  Ibid. 
 
170  Sieren, Frank, The China Code (Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2007) Chapter 6.   
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gathered momentum, Hong Kong’s role as a financial and trade logistics centre 
grew still further.171 
 
Once more the fiscal chemistry worked splendidly.  Hong Kong’s low, simple Tax 
System (very significantly under-pinned by the extraordinary continuing reliance 
on land-transaction-related revenues) was esteemed by traders, manufacturers, 
the service sector and workers alike.  Trade boomed.  The Revenue Regime 
both benefited from this and, due to those low simple taxes, helped amplify 
Hong Kong’s economic success.  At base, what it did was leave most income, 
whether in the form of profits, rent or wages, in the hands of Hong Kong 
persons.  Re-investment proceeded apace.172  Despite being so taxpayer-
friendly, the system still, year after year, generated more revenue than the 
Government spent, so surpluses accumulated.  Moreover, the Government was 
able to retain healthy surpluses while spending increasingly major amounts on 
public housing and health, education and general infrastructure provision.173  
The glowing economic success arising out of Hong Kong’s globalized 
connections cemented support for the minimalist Tax System.  And this despite 
the fact that it was (and still is) widely acknowledged that Hong Kong’s Tax 
System is outdated.174  Indeed, the IRO, the centre-piece of the current regime, 
                                                 
171  Tsang, op. cit. note 59, Chapter 12. 
 
172  Ibid. 
 
173  Ibid.  The Government spent comparatively little in the form of transfer payments to individual 
persons, however (see footnote 116). 
 
174  The Hong Kong Government acknowledges that this is so.  See: Public Finance - Need to 
Broaden Tax Base, at: http://www.info.gov.hk/yearbook/2003/english/chapter03/03_04.html.  See, 
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has remained essentially unchanged in its fundamentals from the time it was 
introduced in 1947, despite the fact that, since then, three major re-examinations 
of the IRO by Review Committees have taken place (in 1954, 1968 and 1976). 
 
Since 1997, for a variety of reasons the Revenue Regime has been fairly 
severely tested both directly and indirectly.  These reasons include: the learning-
curve problems of the first HKSAR Government; the impact of the AFC; other 
regional challenges (including the SARS crisis) and adapting to the new political-
economic relationship with Beijing.   
 
The new Government found itself plunged into repetitive, substantial budget 
deficits from the late 1990s until around 2005.  The primary causes of this 
included across-the-board sinking asset prices (a product of the AFC and the 
HKD peg to the USD175), stalled growth, and entrenched consumer-price 
deflation, leading to a period of year-on-year recession not seen in Hong Kong 
since WW II.  This experience made the narrowness of the overall tax base in 
Hong Kong clearer than ever before.176  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
too: the proposals put forward by the British Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong at 
http://www.britcham.com/asp/ArticleDetail.asp?ArticleId=259; Brown, Stephen, Fung, Edward K. 
W., Loh, Christine, Uebergang, Kylie and Xu, Stephen, The Budget and Public Finance in Hong 
Kong, at: http://www.civic-exchange.org/publications/2003/BudgetReport.pdf; and, Editorial, 
Tsang should make a stand on GST, South China Morning Post, November 17, 2005, A16. 
 
175  See footnotes 40 and 102. 
 
176  For a detailed discussion of these developments, see: Cullen, Richard and Krever, Tor, The 
Relationship Between Tax Reform and Political Reform in Hong Kong (2006) 24 Law in Context, 
11. 
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In response, the Government eventually set up, in 2000, an Advisory Committee 
on New Broad-Based Taxes.  In its report,177 the Committee agreed that Hong 
Kong’s tax base was very narrow by international standards and that this 
characteristic, in addition to leading to low revenue productivity during economic 
downturns, exacerbated economic distortions and was slow to adjust to 
changing demographics.   
 
By 2004, the HKSAR Government had concluded that reform of the Tax System 
was required.178  It remains unsure about the nature and extent of that reform, 
however.  Fundamental issues that need to be addressed are numerous, and 
include how the Government can best be weaned from its continuing, excessive 
dependency on revenues derived from land-related transactions, whether 
reforms should be considered to widen the tax base, and how the tax burden 
can be shared more fairly under any reformed system.  In addition to the above, 
there are other important concerns that arguably suggest the future use of 
“green taxes” in Hong Kong.179 
 
                                                 
177  See: http://www.fstb.gov.hk/tb/acnbt/english/finalrpt/finalrpt.html.  
 
178  See: Public Finance - Need to Broaden Tax Base, at: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/yearbook/2003/english/chapter03/03_04.html. 
 
179  VanderWolk, Jefferson, Broadening Hong Kong’s Tax Base: Politically Acceptable Broad-based 
Consumption Taxes, A submission in response to the Hong Kong’s Government’s Consultation 
Document on Tax Reform, dated July, 2006 and the Interim Report thereon dated December, 2006 
(on file with authors). 
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In July 2006, the Government produced a public discussion document, 
“Broadening the Tax Base”.180  Not surprisingly, given the document’s title, the 
Government made clear therein that its main objective in seeking to reform the 
tax system was to widen the tax base, as opposed to increasing tax revenue.  
Thus, increases in the rates of existing income taxes were not seen as 
appropriate.  According to the document, not only would such increases fail to 
expand the tax base, they would also be contrary to the international trend 
towards lowering income tax rates, and thus risk losing mobile labour and capital 
to other jurisdictions.181  
 
In the document, the Government considered several alternative ways of 
broadening the tax base: the introduction of new taxes (a Capital Gains Tax, a 
Goods and Services Tax (GST), a tax on dividends); an increase in the 
proportion of citizens paying Income Tax (through a reduction in personal 
allowances); and the taxation of the world-wide income of citizens.  Of these 
alternatives, the Government came out strongly in favour of the GST option. The 
Government gave several reasons for this choice. First, currently Hong Kong’s 
tax base has, by international standards, a low reliance on taxes from goods and 
                                                 
180 See: http://www.taxreform.gov.hk/eng/doc_and_leaflet.htm.  In the Hong Kong context, the term  
“tax base” is used as shorthand when discussing the specific local problem of:  (A) having a 
narrow mix of possible taxes; which (B) often only apply (for a range of reasons) to limited 
segment of taxpayers otherwise prima facie liable to pay the relevant tax.   More general 
definitions are as follows: Definition 1 - Measure upon which the assessment or determination of 
tax liability is based. For example, taxable income is the tax base for income tax and assessed 
value is the tax base for property taxes;  Definition 2 - Total of taxable assets, income, and 
assessed value of property within the tax jurisdiction of a government.  See: Business Dictionary – 
Definition of Tax Base, at: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/tax-base.html. 
 
181  Tax Reform, ibid. 
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services. Second, as the population ages, the Salaries Tax base, on which 
government revenues now rely significantly, will fall in relative terms.  Third, the 
GST was seen as providing a comparatively stable revenue base. Fourth, being 
broad-based, it would not need to be introduced at a high rate. Fifth, it is seen to 
be fair, in the sense that individual consumption determines the tax burden.  
Sixth, it is difficult to avoid. Seventh, it is capable of growing in line with the 
economy, in spite of an ageing population. Finally, by obviating the need for 
increases in other taxes, it would maintain Hong Kong’s competitiveness.182 
   
At the same time as releasing the document, the Government instigated a public 
consultation period (from July 2006 to March 2007) on the possible directions for 
reform.  However, after the announcement of the public consultation period, 
Hong Kong quickly witnessed a series of significant demonstrations against the 
proposed GST.  Given the intensity of opposition to the GST in the streets 
(echoed in much of the media) and the fact that political parties from across the 
political spectrum (pro-Government/Beijing and pan-democrat) expressed 
hostility to the tax, the Government withdrew it as an option “on the table” in 
December 2006, well before the consultation period was over.183  Since the 
incumbent Chief Executive (Political Leader) of the HKSAR, Donald Tsang, was 
                                                 
182  Ibid. 
 
183  Cheng, Jonathan, Sales tax fiasco clouds Tang’s fourth budget, The Standard, February 26, 2007 
at: 
http://www.thestandard.hk/news_detail.asp?we_cat=4&art_id=38915&sid=12372543&con_type=
3&d_str=20070226.  Hong Kong’s political parties remain divided primarily according to whether 
they support faster-paced or slower/very slow-paced further democratization, with pro-Beijing and 
pro-Government parties all being in the latter camp. 
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facing a form of election in March 2007, it might have been that his campaign 
advisers also thought it wise to “bury” the GST proposal so it could not become 
an issue during the main election campaign.184 
 
Tax reform is one of several issues where the Government swings between 
policy boldness and policy timidity.  With current tax revenue streams now back 
at very high levels, the Government can, today, more readily postpone boldness 
until another day.185  The structural weaknesses identified in the Hong Kong tax 
system during the recent debate remain in place, however.  In particular, the tax 
base remains as narrow as ever – and the distorting impact of the Government’s 
                                                 
184  Donald Tsang was re-elected as CE in March 2007.  His sole opponent was Alan Leong (a leading 
barrister and prominent member of the pro-democracy Civic Party).  This was, however, an 
election which Mr Tsang could not lose.  Ultimate control by Beijing of the composition of the 
clear majority of the 800 member Election Committee (see: Annex 1 of the Basic Law) ensured 
this.  Still, for the first time since the creation of the HKSAR, Hong Kong witnessed a genuine 
campaign contest – with competing, comparatively detailed policy debates (including two live 
television debates).  For a sharp commentary on this recent election, see: Kwok, Kar Ki, Letter to 
Hong Kong, Radio Television Hong Kong, February 11, 2007 at: 
http://gbcode.rthk.org.hk/b5i/www.rthk.org.hk/rthk/radio3/lettertohongkong/20070211.html.   For 
a good discussion of the importance of fiscal issues related to that campaign see: Tsang, Yok Sing, 
Can Fiscal Prudence Survive Democracy?, at: 
http://www.dab.org.hk/en/main.jsp?content=article-content.jsp&categoryId=1241&articleId=482. 
 
185  Revenues are now running so strongly in the Government’s favour that – a year out from the 
original push for a GST – there were calls for reductions in existing taxes.  See: Eng, Dennis, 
Windfall in revenue spurs tax relief call, South China Morning Post, July 16, 2007, A1.  These 
calls have now been agreed to by the Chief Executive.  See: Cheung, Jimmy, Tsang sets “new 
direction” for HK, South China Morning Post, October 11, 2007, A1. 
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addiction to land-transaction revenues remains deep-rooted.186  Tax reform has 
been delayed but not postponed indefinitely.187   
 
Richard Cullen and Richard Simmons of Lingnan Unversity in Hong Kong 
completed, in May, 2007 the first face to face survey (of almost 800 residents) in 
Hong Kong looking at a broad range of attitudes towards the operation of the 
current Tax System (and also the political arrangements) in the HKSAR.188  On 
wide tax reform issues, the survey highlights mostly positive – or, at least, non-
hostile - views on a range of matters, including, acceptability of the current Tax 
System, tax fairness, and the cost-effectiveness of government taxation and 
expenditure.  The study also confirms that Hong Kong citizens remain notably 
apprehensive about the introduction of new taxes.  However, Hong Kong people 
are increasingly concerned about the deteriorating environment, and they may be 
receptive to the Government implementing certain new “green taxes” if these can 
be shown to help redress environmental degradation whilst also raising 
revenue.189 
 
                                                 
186  In just one quarter of the financial year, April 1, 2007- March 31, 2008, Government direct land 
transaction revenues totalled over $US1.1 billion (see: Government makes $8.7 billion from land 
sales, Radio Television Hong Kong News, July 17, 2007, at: 
http://www.rthk.org.hk/rthk/news/englishnews/news.htm?englishnews&20070717&56&416399 . 
 
187  The CE of the HKSAR, Donald Tsang, noted in his 2007 Policy Address on October 10, 2007 that 
Hong Kong’s narrow tax base remained a major concern.  See: Cheung, Jimmy, Tsang sets “new 
direction” for HK, South China Morning Post, October 11, 2007, A1.   
 
188  Cullen, Richard and Simmons, Richard, Tax Reform – and Democratic Reform – in Hong Kong: 
What do the People Think? (2008) 52 British Tax Review (forthcoming). 
 
189  Ibid. 
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Some further interesting collective views are highlighted by the study.  For 
example, it seems clear from the survey data that, despite exhibiting large (and 
increasing) wealth disparities, the HKSAR does not present fertile ground for 
creating a democracy-driven, advanced welfare state.190  The survey data also 
indicate that the demand for greater democratization in Hong Kong is high.  
Some linkages between tax reform and political reform appear to exist, but the 
                                                 
190  The advanced welfare state can be characterized as: “[O]ne of the hallmarks of the "Golden Age" 
of post-war prosperity, [which] implied more than a mere upgrading of existing social policies in 
the developed industrial world. In the broadest of terms, it represented an effort to bring about 
economic, moral and political reconstruction. Economically, it departed from the orthodoxies of 
the pure market nexus and required the extension of income and employment security as a right of 
citizenship. Morally, it sought to defend the ideas of social justice, solidarity and universalism. 
Politically, the welfare state formed part of a project of nation building, affirming liberal 
democracy against the twin perils of fascism and bolshevism. Many countries became self-
proclaimed welfare states, not so much to give a label to their social policies as to foster national 
social integration.”  Esping-Andersen, Gosta, After the Golden Age: The Future of the Welfare 
State in the New Global Order (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development – Paper 
Number 7) at: 
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpPublications)/D93F019CFA85A04280256B650
041F3F5?OpenDocument.  Hong Kong has what has been described as a “residual welfare state” 
where public transfers to individuals are notably limited but where public spending on the 
provision of infrastructure is significant. See: Lee, Eliza, Wing-yee, The Politics of Welfare 
Developmentalism in Hong Kong, at: 
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/0/B764A113DEE628D4C125706D0032DA6
6?OpenDocument.  On poverty in the HKSAR, see, Gordon, Peter, Distribution of wealth so poor, 
The Standard, October 3, 1997, at: 
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=15&art_id=54360&sid=15557321&con_
type=3.  See also: Poverty in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Council of Social Services, at: 
http://www.hkcss.org.hk/pra/ecp/pov_rate_91-05.pdf . (This study also showed that the Gini-
coefficient figure in the HKSAR in 2001 (0,525) was even higher than that applying in the 
Mainland PRC (0.447) in the same year.)  See, too: Oxfam Advocates Legislation of Minimum 
Wage, Oxfam, Hong Kong, at: http://www.oxfam.org.hk/english/; Zou, Hanru, Opportunity 
Trumps Wealth in Hong Kong, China Daily, at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-
07/20/content_5439984.htm; and Fact Sheet. Gini Coefficient, Legislative Council, Hong Kong, 
Research and Library Division, at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-
05/english/sec/library/0405fs07e.pdf.  The HKSAR Government contends that raw Gini-
coefficient figures can be misleading and that the real situation in Hong Kong is not as bad as that 
indicated by such figures.  Moreover, it argues that, in an economy in transition to one largely 
knowledge- and skills-based,, such figures are likely to be amplified (during the transition period).  
See: Chan, K. C., Gini-coefficient, Response to LegCo Question, by Prof. K. C. Chan, Secretary 
for Financial Services and the Treasury, July 4, 2007, at: 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200707/04/P200707040186.htm.   
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two zones of reform are seen, overall, as primarily giving rise to stand alone 
issues.191   
 
Hong Kong’s minimalist Tax System, notably shaped for well over 150 years by 
(changing) globalization forces, thus seems still to be well regarded across the 
socio-economic spectrum in the HKSAR. 
 
There is one area of the Tax System where some significant change has been 
taking place, however, and that is the increasing tendency for the HKSAR to 
seek out and sign general double tax instruments.  The general DTTs (with 
Belgium, Thailand and Luxembourg) and the broad DTA (with Mainland China) 
are discussed above.  Here, we should note that, once more, there is good 
evidence that trading / globalization factors are what have driven this current 
move to remodel the HKSAR Revenue Regime, to a degree.   
 
First, Hong Kong’s relationship with the Mainland is now such that the already 
strong economic integration is accelerating.  This, in turn, mandates the need for 
much greater clarity with respect to the impact of the two separate Tax Systems 
on a very wide range of cross-border activities, hence the need for the DTA.  
Next, the negative impact of Hong Kong’s lack of an extensive DTT network with 
its many trading partners is, today, becoming more of a concern.   
 
                                                 
191  Cullen and Simmons, op. cit. note 188. 
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Macdonald and Pandiri put it this way: 
The absence of treaty protection can lead to foreign income paid to Hong 
Kong being subject to higher rates of withholding tax by the country from 
which the foreign income is paid. 
 
In addition, Hong Kong’s liberal, low taxation system may result in a Hong 
Kong’s subsidiary being subject to the controlled foreign corporation or 
other anti-tax deferral laws of many countries in which the shareholders 
are based, for example, Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
 
Interest expense deductions are severely limited in Hong Kong.  For 
example, interest expense is only deductible if one of these conditions is 
met: 
x the interest expense relates to funds which are borrowed by a 
financial institution; 
 
x the lender, not being a financial institution, is subject to tax in Hong 
Kong on the interest received; 
 
x the principal was borrowed from a financial institution and was not 
secured or guaranteed by any deposit of which the interest is not 
chargeable to Hong Kong tax; 
 
x the principal is borrowed from an unrelated party and is used to 
purchase plant and machinery or trading stock; or 
 
x the principal is borrowed by the issue of a corporate debenture or 
other such public issue. 
 
In other words, it is very difficult for interest expense to be deductible 
when it is paid to an affiliated company outside Hong Kong.  Furthermore, 
interest related to funds used to acquire shares would not be deductible 
unless the shares are held as part of the borrower’s trading 
stock/inventory.192 
 
One feature of the three general DTTs signed so far is worth noting.  Although 
each of these DTTs allow for exchange of certain information already held, none 
of them allows one jurisdiction to request that the other jurisdiction proactively 
                                                 
192  Macdonald, Barry and Pandiri, Sujata , Hong Kong: Post-1997 Corporation Tax Issues (1997) 3 
Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, 27. 
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seek information on particular matters in the manner set out in Article 4 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention (2005), which provides, inter alia,  that: 
If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this 
Article, the other Contracting State shall use its information gathering 
measures to obtain the requested information, even though that other 
State may not need such information for its own tax purposes.193 
 
How successful the HKSAR will be in signing further DTTs whilst retaining the 
limited disclosure requirements found in the 1998 version of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention remains to be seen.194  That said, the instruments signed with 
Belgium and Luxembourg provide useful DTT platforms for enterprises operating 
between the HKSAR and potentially other countries in the European Union (EU) 
and perhaps beyond – rather than just Belgium and Luxembourg.195 
 
 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
Consider the Imperial British perspective in the mid-to-late 18th century; it was 
their Empire, so surely they could tax it as they wished?.  Most controversially, 
this attitude led to taxing the American Colonies, from London, of that British 
Empire.  The long-distance taxes which London attempted to impose on the 
American Colonies included Stamp Duties and other indirect taxes.  Favourable 
                                                 
193  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Model Tax Convention (15 
July 2005 version).  See, also, Blanco, Evan and Roels, Jan, Hong Kong Signs Its First 
Comprehensive Income Tax Treaty (2004) 33 Tax Notes International, 227. 
 
194  De Ridder and Van Gomel take the view that the 1998 Convention only requires disclosure on 
actual taxes specifically covered in the particular DTT – see, de Ridder, Pieter and Van Gompel, 
Jan , Hong Kong’s International Gateway:  Belgium (2005) 11 Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 120. 
 
195  See, further: Olesnicky, Michael, Hong Kong:  2000 Year in Review (2001) 24 Tax Notes 
International 1400; and Quaghebeur, Marc, Belgium: Belgium Clarifies Repatriation Issues in 
Hong Kong Tax Treaty (2005) 38 Tax Notes International, 201.  
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(to the East India Company) arrangements which related to the selling of tea, 
were also imposed on the American Colonies.  These measures proved to be no 
less inflammatory to colonial political sentiment in America.196  War followed.  
The consequent defeat of Britain, by 1781,197 was confirmed by the Treaty of 
Paris (which formally ended the war) in 1783.198 
 
By 1841, the British were well recovered from Imperial humiliation in America.  
But lessons had been learned which were to have an important impact of the 
preferred form of Revenue Regime to be used in new British Colonies.  Most 
notable was the shunning of direct, London-imposed taxation and an emphasis 
                                                 
196  “In 1765, the British government imposed a stamp duty on all official documents in the colonies. 
The idea was to help pay for the rising defence costs of the colonies - the majority of which was 
still being borne by the British government. The 13 disparate colonies suddenly found a common 
voice in their antipathy towards this taxation.     The furore was abated when the government 
withdrew the Stamp Acts but was further ignited in 1768 when new indirect taxes were 
introduced.  These also were hastily withdrawn when the depth of feeling was demonstrated to the 
government.  Revolutionary feelings may well have subsided but for the fact that the East India 
Company had been experiencing financial problems.  To help ease their financial burdens, the 
government agreed to break their own Navigation Acts and allow the company to sell their tea 
direct to America.  This should have made tea attractively inexpensive in the thirteen colonies; 
despite the fact that the colonists would have to pay a small duty there.  Unfortunately, the British 
misread the mood of the colonists who were not prepared to have the principle of taxation 
imposed on them in any form whatsoever.  The so-called 'Boston Tea Party' ensued as angry 
opponents of the tax boarded three ships on Boston harbour and threw their chests of tea into the 
water.  Britain's response deeply concerned all of the other colonies; heavy fines were imposed 
and the port was to remain closed until the tea had been paid for.  Many colonists deduced that 
their rights could not be safe guarded against the whims of a British government and they prepared 
themselves for war as they declared themselves independent in 1776. … {A} combination of 
American soldiers surrounding Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown and a large French fleet blockading 
the coast    led to their final humiliating surrender in 1781.  The First British Empire came to an 
end, but British interests would still remain in the continent as Canada received a huge influx of 
loyalists fleeing Revolutionary America which would allow it to consolidate and expand its own 
borders.”  See, http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/13colonies.htm. 
197  Ibid. 
 
198  See, The Paris Peace Treaty of 1783, at: 
http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/paris/. 
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on creating stand-alone, locally-anchored Revenue Regimes.  A mainstay of this 
revised approach was, if at all possible, to place land sales, land transaction 
charges and land taxes at or close to the pivot of each new colonial financing 
strategy. 
 
When the British established the foothold adjacent to China they had long 
coveted, on Hong Kong Island, the attractions of a land-focussed Revenue 
Regime were amplified by the decision, from the outset, to make Hong Kong a 
Free Port.  This choice denied Hong Kong access to Customs Duties, another 
traditional bastion of colonial finances.  For the first 100 years of British Hong 
Kong, the Revenue Regime installed during the foundation years of the Colony, 
remained largely unchanged.  In addition to income from land sales, property 
rates and land-transaction imposts, the Colony relied on a limited range of other 
sources, including certain fees and charges, Excise Duties and Stamp Duties.  
When one considers that in the hundred years between 1841 and 1940, the 
population grew 100-fold, from under 8,000 to over 800,000,199 to have 
maintained such a stable Revenue Regime is quite a feat.   
 
How was this managed?   
x First, the total area comprising the Crown Colony increased greatly, 
initially in 1860 and then in 1898.  This expansion explains part of the 
population increase.  A key explanatory factor of the durability of the early 
Revenue Regime was the land-as-commodity funding which was a central 
feature of the system.  The expansion of Hong Kong increased the public 
“land-bank” greatly.   
                                                 
199  See, Timeline, at: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~amduckwo/janice/Timeline1.html. 
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x Another key factor was the comparatively low cost of providing 
government services.  Services were limited in keeping with 19th century 
practice but even more so given the remarkable self-reliance (repeated 
examples of dire poverty notwithstanding) of the majority Chinese 
population.  Defence costs were borne, primarily, by London.  Hong Kong 
was an outpost far from London – and other substantial parts of the British 
Empire.  Defence costs were significant. 
 
x A third factor was the remarkable economic success of the new Free Port.  
A great deal of that success pivoted for many decades around the 
industrial scale shipment of opium to China by the British from India.  (It 
was primarily disputation with China about Britain’s right to export opium 
that led to the First Opium War and the seizure of Hong Kong Island.)  The 
Hong Kong Government benefited directly from this trade through licence 
fees and other charges which applied.  As late as 1917, the Colonial 
Office noted that up to one third of all revenue in Hong Kong arose out of 
opium trading activities.200    
 
x On these foundations, however, was built an extraordinarily successful 
trading economy which was not opium-reliant.201  The very high levels of 
economic activity have been an important factor in maintaining sufficient 
revenues using a minimalist taxing approach.  That minimalist taxing 
approach has, in turn, amplified the attractiveness of Hong Kong as a 
trading centre. 
 
 
 
One truly major change to the Hong Kong Revenue Regime was the introduction 
of Income Tax just on 100 years after the founding of British Hong Kong.  In the 
teeth of immense local resistance from the business community, the Government 
first introduced Income Tax in 1940 and then the IRO in 1947.  The threat of war 
generally – and Japanese invasion particularly – drove the first initiative.  The 
need to find a new revenue source to fund reconstruction of the war-ravaged 
                                                 
200  La Motte, Ellen N., The Opium Monopoly (MacMillan, New York) 1920) Chapter 7 (Hong Kong) 
at: http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/om/om7.htm. 
 
201  Against remarkable odds and as a product of an agreement between the UK and Qing Dynasty 
China, the officially sanctioned trade in opium between Hong Kong and Mainland China was 
increasingly and notably reduced between 1907 and 1917.  See, La Motte, ibid., Chapter XV, The 
History of the Opium Trade in China. 
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Colony drove the second.  Still, the Income Tax adopted in both cases was 
designed to retain low rates and to be quite limited in its application through the 
use of source-based, schedular taxation.   
 
It is worth noting that the post-war Governments of Hong Kong were, in fact 
quietly but actively hostile to the idea of seeking low-cost development finance 
from the World Bank when Hong Kong was being re-built right through into the 
1960s.  Almost certainly Hong Kong would have qualified to borrow from this 
then new international financial institution (which had been established in 1947).  
Successive Hong Kong Governments implied they would accept such loans if 
they were offered on “reasonable terms” – whilst, in reality, avoiding entering into 
any such borrowing for fear of the way the World Bank might begin to demand 
changes in the Hong Kong Government’s preferred  economic model.  In 
particular, the Government worried that the World Bank would strongly advocate 
the adoption of a more modern Tax System and insist on the collection of proper 
economic statistics.202   
 
Hong Kong is now – and has been for some decades – a First World City-State.  
But the Revenue Regime it has today looks not that much different to that 
applying more than 60 years ago.  It is genuinely difficult to think of many other 
developed jurisdictions (apart from “mono-culture” gambling economies, 
                                                 
202  Goodstadt, Leo, Profits Politics and Panics: Hong Kong’s Banks and the making of a Miracle 
Economy, 1935 – 1985 (Hong Unversity Press, Hong Kong, 2007) 98-100.  Hong Kong, thus, 
opted to reject certain globalizing influences – when they threatened to interfere, at all, with 
localized economic decision making. 
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perhaps) where this is so.  Moreover, once one removes Income Tax from the 
frame, the structure of today’s Revenue Regime in Hong Kong retains a look that 
is not all that different from the basic structure applying 100 years ago.  The 
HKSAR’s new found interest in DTTs may modify the overall look of the Revenue 
Regime to a degree over the coming decades.  But the impact of such changes 
looks like being fairly marginal.  A more drastic change that does look possible 
within a decade or two is the introduction of a general consumption tax or GST.  
 
As we consider the interaction between the phenomenon of globalization and the 
shaping of municipal Taxation Systems, Hong Kong presents itself a most 
interesting jurisdiction.  The discussion above demonstrates, however, that Hong 
Kong is a rather special case.  Distinctive factors related to Hong Kong itself 
explaining why this is so include: (A) the special viability (due to Hong Kong’s 
confined size) of the land-as-commodity revenue scheme; (B) the cross-
generational, consistent, energy, hard work, intelligence and remarkable self-
reliance of the local population;203 (C) the income generating (and capital wealth 
building) role of decades of involvement in the opium trade; (D) basically sound, 
long-term institutional development; (E) the geographic location generally and 
proximity to China in particular; (F) the free-port based engagement with 
international trade from day one of British Hong Kong; and (G) Victoria Harbour. 
 
                                                 
203  There is claim, possibly apocryphal, that Friedrich Hayek once observed  that socialism is an 
excellent system – for up to 12 people.  The socio-economic operation of the typical Chinese 
family lends a certain positive credence to this claim. 
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Hong Kong, it turns out, also made the most of its “First Mover Advantage”.  
Later trumpet players may emulate and even show notably greater technical skill 
than Louis Armstrong.  But no matter how good they may be, only Louis 
Armstrong can be Louis Armstrong. 
 
All of this suggests that any specific detailed lessons Hong Kong may offer in 
terms of comprehensive Tax Policy development are limited.   
 
Some broad lessons are suggested by the Hong Kong experience, however.  
First, long-term active and consistent engagement with a globalized world can be 
used to help drive remarkable local advantage.  Next, this kind of engagement 
can assist in shaping and sustaining a durable, comparatively simple Revenue 
Regime.  Finally, the low tax-related transaction costs in Hong Kong come at 
equity and revenue-leakage costs, but, in the final squaring of the ledger the 
question is at least raised whether this approach may, in the long-run, promote 
greater cost-effectiveness (and lower, overall citizen tax-hostility) than more 
modern, more perfected, more complex Tax Systems.   
 
Due to its striking, comparative simplicity, the Hong Kong Tax System may better 
satisfy the test most commonly associated with William of Occam (1285 – 1349 
AD) than most other developed-world, tax jurisdictions.  This test, often referred 
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to as “Occam’s Razor”, states: "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate" or 
"plurality should not be posited without necessity”.204 
 
 
204  See, further, Occam’s Razor, at: http://www.skepdic.com/occam.html.  Australia recently 
announced yet another extensive review of its complex Tax and Transfer Payment Systems.  The 
Federal Government panel set up in 2008 to review Australia’s Future Tax System has now issued 
the primary Discussion Paper (DP) for this new review.  It is entitled, The Architecture of 
Australia’s Tax and Transfer System 
(http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/Content/downloads/report/Architecture_of_Australias_tax
_and_transfer_system.pdf).  The DP comprises 340 pages of dense detail on the operation of the 
Australian Tax System and Transfer Payments System and the way they interact (or fail, properly, 
to interact).  “The review has found 125 taxes in Australia across all jurisdictions – apparently 
simply enumerating them was difficult given the state of data available – but 90% of revenue is 
earned from just 10 of them. The remaining 115 taxes – and many of them are Commonwealth, 
not State taxes - yield only 10% of revenue.” (Keane, Bernard, Dense Detail on the Root and 
Branch of Tax, Crikey E-Newsletter, August 6, 2008).  Australia’s Tax System has, over time, 
arguably achieved significant plurality beyond necessity. 
